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CITIZEN TEACHER: DAMNED IF YOU DO, DAMNED IF 
YOU DON'T 
Susan P. Stuart-
The recent Supreme Court case of Garcetti V-. Ceballos is becoming 
one of the most-used cases in its mere two-year history. It denies to 
public employees the protection of the First Amendment when speaking 
in their official duties. In reviewing the cases both leading up to and 
then relying oh Garcetti, one is struck by the inherent conflict that now-
permeates some school board-employee relationships. Whereas 
preceding cases attempted to reach a balance between the school board 
and its employees' speech rights, bad management practices now seem 
to trump the First Amendment. Such practices have school boards 
discharging teachers and administrators for speaking out truthfully-
on matters of fiscal mismanagement, student discipline, and similar 
school district problems. In the context of those cases, this Article posits 
that being seduced by the weapon of Garcetti 's absolute power will 
create unanticipated and legal consequences to both school boards and 
the educational institution itself 
• Associate Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. Th~ author taught in the public 
schools for six years before attending law school and represented Indiana State_ Teachers Associati.on 
during nine years -of private practice-. Many thanks to Ezra Hurwitz for his exemplary work as my 
research assistant, and to Bill Gist, 1ST A UniServ Director, and Dick Darko, ISTA General Counsel, for 
their willingness to assist in this project. Thanks also to Ivan Bodensteiner for our conversations 
comparing student speech with teacher speech. I was inspired by my father, Thomas Stuart; a high 
school principal who spoke truth to power and lost his job but regained his purpose as a guidance 
counselor, and by my mother, Mary Stuart, an elementary school teacher who always hoped for the best 
from school administrations but understood-the balancing power of the union. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In perhaps one of the most extraordinarily ill-considered and short-
sighted opinions penned by the United States Supreme Court in recent 
years, Garcetti v. Ceballos1 is already having an adverse impact on 
teachers and school administrators. More importantly, Garcetti has the 
potential to gravely harm the way school districts discharge their 
educational function because of the case's adverse impact on school 
employees, especially teachers but also sc:hool administrators. If 
Garcetti is wielded by school boards, the fallout may also affect the 
efficient operation of the school district by impairing educators' duties 
to th.eir stud.ents and to the public weal. 
What exactly is the weapon that Garcetti gives to school boards that 
could do so much harrn? In short, it allows school boards to retaliate 
without consequence against teachers for doing their jobs properly. 
Such retaliation may be as draconian as the educator's discharge. And it 
may already be too late to stop the trend, given the number of school 
boards relying on Garcetti to support adverse employment actions 
against teachers and administrators since it was handed down in 
2006. 
The remedy that the Supreme Court has removed from teachers' 
arsenal of protection is the long-recognized First Amendment right 
whereby an individual public employee's speech may be protected from 
the power of the state.2 Where they might otherwise have a 
constitutional claim under the First Amendment for an adverse job 
action their employers have taken based on their speech, the Supreme 
Court now says they have no such thing if their words were uttered or 
their deeds done in the course of their employment duties.3 Since May 
30, 2006, a school board may lawfully retaliate against teachers who 
voice concerns about a school district's not serving disabled children 
adequately,4 fraud and mismanagement in the operation of a federally 
funded program,5 misuse of athletic funds,6 and student discipline.7 
1. 547 u.s. 410 (2006). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Public Employee Speech, 120 HARV. L. REV. 273 (2006); 
Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1007 (2005). 
3. Garcetti, 547 U.S . at423. 
4. See. e.g., Houlihan v. Sussex Technical Sch. Dist., 461 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D. Del. 2006); 
Yatzus v. Appoquinimink Sch. Dist., 458 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D. DeL 2006); Ryan v. Shawnee-Mission 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 437 F. Supp. 2d I 233 (0. Kan. 2006), reconsideration denied, No. 05-2213, 
2006 WL 2475326 (D. Kan. Aug. 25; 2006). 
5. See, e.g., Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d l32J (1Oth Cir. 2007); Battle v. 
Bd. of Regents, 468 FJd 755 (lith Cir. 2006). 
6. See. e.g., Williams v. Dallas lndep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689 {5th Cir. 2007). 
7. See, e.g., Cavazos v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 210 F. App'x 414 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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More acts and deeds will surely be punished as administrators feel 
pressured by school boards to keep order in their schools. Ironically, the 
administrators who mete out these disciplinary actions on behalf of their 
employers are le_ft in an even more tenuous position because they are 
equally affected by Garcetti, but generally they are not accorded the 
"just cause" contractual or statutory protections given to teachers, 
especially to those on tenure. 
The cases keep rolling in as public employers take advantage of 
Garcetti' s ruling to justify retaliating against employees for doing their 
jobs. As of its first anniversary on May 30, 2007, 280 opinions have 
cited Garcetti, generally favorably in upholding the firing of any number 
of public employees including teachers. Prior to then, courts had relied 
primarily on Connick v. Myers8 to determine the lawfulness of 
retaliatory acts under the First Amendment. Less than one-fourth as 
many cases 60 in all jurisdictions cited to Connick in Connick's first 
year.9 
This trend portends danger for schools in general and for students in 
particular. The message the Supreme Court has sent to public 
employees, including teachers, is they can be fired even if they are doing 
their jobs correctly. Communicating is what teachers do for a living; 
communicating about the conditions of their schools and the needs of 
students is what teachers do as a profession. In light of the educator 
cases that have relied on Garcettl, three communication contexts can 
now jeopardize a teacher's job. The first type of communication for 
which a school board can retaliate against a teacher is communication 
classified as an official duty of the job, excluding instruction.. Of the 
three types of speech involved_, retaliation for this is probably the most 
grievous. Teachers can do their jobs perfectly and beautifully and still 
be punished. Garcetti does not even give teachers a legitimate choice: 
they can refuse to do their job that is, refuse to communicate and be 
punished; the_y can do their jobs and be punished. 
Second in the courts' sights are communications that are job-related 
• 
although not necessarily associated with enumerated, "official" duties. 
Such speech might include matters related to the interior workings of the 
school or other matters that do not pertain directly to a teacher's specific 
classroom job. This type of speech often arises for more altruistic 
,8. 461 u.s. 138 (l983). 
9. In all fairness, one cause of the exploding number may be that the research database used to 
count those opinions Westlaw . seems to have stored more unpublished opinions than in the years 
immediately succeeding Connick. But that circumstance cannot account for what appears to be an 
explosion in questionable management decisions in the recent years. By its second anniversy, the 
number of cases citing to Garcetti had more than doubled. 
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reasons than by compulsion of the job itself. For example, teachers who 
care enough about their profession and their students believe they should 
speak up about those matters as the right, the ethical, and the 
professional thing to do. However, the Court now says that teachers, as 
. . 
public employees, do not have the same protections as ordinary citizens 
when it comes to speech and acts otherwise protected by the First 
Amendment. Garcetti now forces teachers to choose between their 
professionalism .and their livelihood. If teachers can be· fired for caring 
about their jobs and their students, why should teachers continue to 
care? 
Third is the type of speech that the Garcetti majority skirted: 
academic freedom. Although the Court assured the dissenting justices 
that the decision had no impact on educators' academic freedom in the 
classroom, a contrary trend may be emerging in some courts, That trend 
assures that school boards have complete control over speech in the 
classroom because of their supposed control over the content of the 
curriculum. Teachers may not be saying anything wrong or even outside 
the content of the curriculum, but the courts_ are interfering in 
discretionary teaching decisions and exerting an unwarranted 
paternalistic control over that skill for which teachers teach and that 
creativity to adapt their instruction to the needs of the classroom and the 
subject matter. 
Several negative consequ-etJ.ces necessarily arise from these decisions. 
One of those consequences is the attack on teacher morale and 
professionalism. A necessary adjunct of that consequence is that 
students no longer have the benefit of the best that teachers have to offer 
as civic role models: teachers will instead guard their job security by 
hewing to a "party" line rather than by offering the panoply of choices 
that only a democracy can offer. A second major consequence is the 
loss of the nature of the civic institution itself. Confining teachers to 
their oars rather than allowing them to rock the boat is anathema to the 
duty, responsibility, and nature of public schools. A third consequence 
is that teachers will start to air the school district's dirty laundry in 
public. .Now that a school board can retaliate for on-the-job speech,. 
teachers will resort to speaking out at public school board meetings or to 
. . 
the media to achieve the corrections they know must be implemented. 
Last, but not least, school boards and administrators will lose the 
inherent ability to hold teachers accountable for their work, especially in 
the classroom.. Perhaps even worse, the door may be opened for 
asserting educational malpractice claims. If teachers do not have the 
discretion to do other than follow the direction of the school boards, then 
school boards and school administrators not having delegated any real 
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teaching function will be wholly responsible for the results, not the 
teachers themselves. 
The overarching thesis, then, is that no good can come from school 
districts' using Garcetti to protect them from legitimate First 
Amendment claims by teachers. As the case analyses demonstrate, the 
vast majority of these cases arose from bad management, not from bad 
teaching. Ironically, justice serves those who do wrong rather than those 
who do right. In Part I, this Article briefly outlines the pre-Garcetti First 
Amendment protections for public employees and recounts, briefly, 
some of the ways teachers' First Amendment rights had been protected 
before May 30, 2006. Part I then explains the opinion in Garcetti itself. 
Part II analyzes the Garcetti progeny, including cases for both teachers 
and administrators. Part III addresses the official duties of teachers for 
which they might be punished under the First Amendment. Last, Part IV 
provides an analysis of the harms that will come to students, school 
boards, and the educational institution itself from school boards' relying 
on Garcetti to retaliate against teachers for doing their jobs. 
l. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS CRASH AND BURN 
Although a background survey of this issue might seem a bit 
unnecessary, rather than getting straight to the point in Garcetti, it is 
necessary when dealing with the First Amendment rights of teachers. 
This context is important in understanding the unique citizenship role of 
teachers, who are, as the background demonstrates, not just employees. 
Indeed, one might posit from reading the effusive protections for 
teachers in these survey cases that teachers should enjoy different First 
Amendment rights than other public employees. Regardless, teachers 
have played a critical role in the development of public employee First 
Amendment jurisprudence. And this historical background 
demonstrates how far the Court has strayed from a rational balance of 
the employer-employee relationship to a one-sided analysis of the 
interests of the employer over the good of the goverrunent institution. 
As is their wont and perhaps their plight, teachers have been at the 
forefront of the First Amendment cases, pitting their right to speak 
against their employers' ability to fire them for that right. Indeed, 
teachers have been at the center of most of the First Amendment 
controversies that have arisen out of public employees' speech that have 
reached the Court for at least two reasons. First, teachers' stock in trade 
is speaking. It is also their stock in trade to teach, through instruction 
and example, young Americans to be good citizens, and a responsibility 
of citizenship is exercising one's freedom of speech. Second, teachers 
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view themselves as independent actors: they must make the day-to-day 
decisions to deliver the educational product in this important 
governmental enterprise. They neither welcome nor accept the contrary 
view that they are at the bottom of the educational bureaucracy, below 
school administrators and school boards in the hierarchy, particularly 
because they have as much professional education training as school 
administrators and more so than the vast majority of school board 
members. As a consequence, the relationship between the leading and 
the led is uneasy at best and volatile at worst. These tensions therefore 
make teachers particularly vulnerable to retaliation by their public 
employers school administrators and, through administrators, school 
boards. 
A. The Launch 
Marvin Pickering was just such a teacher. He wrote a letter to the 
editor of his local paper. 10 It resulted from several years' worth of 
financial matters surrounding the building of two new schools in the 
district, 1 1 and in contrast to a series of letters ostensibly from the local 
teachers' union and favorable to the tax increase, Pickering's letter was 
critical of the school board and school superintendent, and of the tax 
increase, which later failed. 12 In particular, he targeted the school 
district's allocation of educational and athletic funding. 13 Pickering also 
wrote that the superintendent had threatened teachers with adverse 
consequences if they opposed the referendum14 and that the letters 
ostensibly from the local teachers' unions had been vetted by the 
superintendent in accordance with school board policy requiring that 
anything submitted to local newspapers must first be checked by the 
building principal then submitted in triplicate to the school district's 
publicity coordinator. 15 However, Pickering's letter also contained 
carelessly researched and false claims that the school district had placed 
10. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968). 
11. First were two votes on bond issues to build the schools, the second of which passed. /d. at 
565-66~ Then three years later, the ·school board proposed two tax increases for increasing educational 
funding revenue. /d. at 566. Both were defeated. /d. The second of these tax increase proposals 
engendered a flurry of articles and letters in the local paper. /d. 
12. /d. at 566. 
13. /d. 
14. ld. at 576, 580-81 (appendix to opinion of the court). Pickering accurately reported the 
superintendent's statement; the meaning of that statement, however, was never clear. /d. at 580-81 
(appendix to opinion of the court). 
15. Jd. at 576-77, 581 (appendix to opinion of the court). 
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athletic expenditures as a higher priority than educational funding. 16 He 
closed with this statement: "I must sign this letter as a citizen, taxpayer 
and voter, not as a teacher, since that freedom has been taken from the 
teachers by the administration. Do you really know what goes on 
behind those stone walls at the high school?"17 After his letter was 
published, Pickering was fired, 18 and he made history in Pickering v. 
Board of Education. 
Pickering attacked the application of Illinois's teacher dismissal 
statute as unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 19 The Illinois 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the school board; the U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed and stated, 
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read to 
suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the 
First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to 
comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of 
the public schools in which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has 
been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.20 
The Court acknowledged, however, that a school district as an 
employer has different interests in regulating teacher speech than the 
govertunent generally might have in regulating speech of the general 
citizenry.21 This acknowledgment established the now-classic balance 
between the "interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees. ''22 
In addressing this balance in Pickering's case, the Court first 
concluded that "the question whether a school system requires additional 
funds is a matter of legitimate public concern on which the judgment of 
the school administration, including the School Board, cannot, in a 
society that leaves such questions to popular vote, be taken as 
conclusive.''23 The Court particularly noted that teachers of all 
citizens have definite and informed opinions about school funding and 
how those funds should be allocated because of their background and 
16. /d. at 577-78, 581 - 82 (appendix to opinion of the court). 
17. ld. at 578. 
18. Id. at 566. 
19. /d. at 565. 
20. /d. at 568. 
21. /d. 
22. /d. 
23. /d. at 571. 
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expertise.24 To prevent them from speaking out would be a disservice to 
the public in general; indeed, they should be encouraged to speak out 
. 25 freely. 
As to the other part of the balancing test, the Court noted that 
Pickering's criticisms were not directed against anyone with whom he 
worked directly.26 Instead, his criticisms were directed against the 
superintendent and school board with whom Pickering had no daily 
contact.27 There was neither a disciplinary issue with an immediate 
superior nor harm to the working relationship of co-workers.28 Despite 
the school board's argument that Pickering had violated his "duty of 
loyalty,"29 the Court determined that his employee relationship with the 
superintendent and school board was rather attenuated and "not the kind 
of close working. relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed 
that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper 
functioning."30 Thus, the Court allowed that criticisms of "nominal 
superio{s" may not be the basis for retaliation. 31 As a consequence, 
Pickering, while contributing to the debate on school board matters, 
stood in the same shoes as the general public: the state could afford the 
school board no greater right to punish Pickering than it ·could punish a 
member of the general public.32 
In essence, the Court determined that "a teacher's exercise of his right 
to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his 
dismissal from public employment". even if the speech is wrong~33 
Instead, the Court said, 
What we . . . have before us is a case in which a teacher has made 
erroneous public statements upon issues then currently the subject of 
public attention, which are critical of his ultimate employer but which are 
neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any way either impeded the 
teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to 
24. /d. at 572. 
25. /d. 
26. ld. at 569-70. 
27. Id. at 569. 
28. /d. at 570. 
29. !d. at 568. 
30. !d. at 570. 
31. /d. at 574. 
32. ld. at 57~. Furthennore, because most of the readers of Pickering's letter greeted it with 
"massive apathy and total disbelief," the statements were not per se ha1 rnful to the operations of the 
school district sufficient for the school board to prove the statutory grounds for Pickering's dismissal. 
/d. at 570-71. Equating its own interests with that of the school district it governed went beyond the 
purview of the school board's interest in controlling teacher speech criticism of the school board was 
not criticism of the school district. /d. at 571. 
33. /d. at 574. 
• 
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have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally. In 
these circumstances we conclude that the interest of the school 
administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to public 
debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar 
contribution by any member of the general public.34 
Thus did the Pickering case ·enter the pantheon of First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
B. The Trajectory 
The Court reaffirmed the Pickering principle in dictum in Perry v. 
Sindermann,35 a higher education case. Robert Sindermann was a rather 
incendiary young professor in the Texas state college system.36 During 
the fourth of a series of one-year contracts at Odessa Junior College, 
Sindermann was elected president of the Texas Junior College Teachers 
Association.37 During the course of those duties, he became embroiled 
in several disputes with the state Board of Regents and some of its 
policies, specifically criticizing the Board's opposition to making 
Odessa Junior College into a four-year institution.38 Sindennann's 
contract was not renewed for a fifth year, ostensibly for 
insubordination.39 The thrust of the Court's decision and the 
"teachable" moment arising from the case surrounded Sindermann's due 
process rights. And those due process rights arose from his claim that 
the Board of Regents improperly retaliated for Sindermann's 
constitutionally protected freedom of speech.40 Relying on Pickering, 
the Court reminded the Board of Regents that "a teacher's public 
criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern may be 
constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impem1issible basis 
for termination of his employment."41 
Not too long after Perry v. Sindermann came City of Madison, Joint 
School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.42 
Although not addressing an employer retaliation claim, the Court was 
very deferential to teachers' First Amendment rights because of their 
employment, and not just their status as citizens. In this case, a local 
34. /d. at 572-73 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
35. 408 u.s. 593 (1972). 
36. /d. at 594. 
37. /d. 
38. /d. at 594-95. 
39. /d. at 595. 
40. /d. 
41. /d. at 598 (citing Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968)). 
42. 429 U.S. 167 (1976). 
• 
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teachers union- Madison Teachers, Inc. filed a complaint before the 
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. The complaint asserted 
that the Madison school board had committed a prohibited labor practice 
when it allowed a nonunion teacher to speak at a public school board 
meeting on a matter related to ongoing collective bargaining.43 After 
deterrnining that the teacher had not engaged in "negotiations'' through 
his presentation, the Supreme Court held that a school board could not 
exclude teacher speech and thereby allow the union to monopolize the 
public debate:, ''He addressed the school board not merely as one of its 
employees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to express his views 
on an important decision of his government. ''44 In once again affirming 
the contribution teachers make to public discourse, the Court asserted, 
"Where the State has opened a forum for direct citizen involvement, it is 
difficult to find justification for excluding teachers who make up the 
overwhelming proportion of school employees and who are most vitally 
concerned with the proceedings."45 The Court explained, ~'Teachers not 
only constitute the overwhelming bulk of employees of the school 
system, but they are the very core of that system; restraining teachers' 
expressions to the board on matters involving the operation of the 
schools would seriously impair the board's ability to govern the 
district."46 Clearly, teachers could not be excluded from speaking out at 
public school board meetings on matters considered to be public 
concerns. 
Then in 1977, along came Fred Doyle, a teacher who did not get 
tenure in part because of a telephone call to a local radio station about a 
memorandum circulated by his principal.47 Doyle was in his fifth year 
of employment with the school district three one-year contracts and 
one two-year contract and was eligible for tenure at the school 
district.48 During the first year of his two-year contract, Doyle served as 
president of his local teachers' association, and he served on the 
association's executive board the second year, a two-year period during 
which there was friction between the school board and the association.49 
Doyle also had a tendency to draw other unwanted attention to himself 
with poor anger management skills that led to dustups with a fellow 
43. /d. at 170-71. 
44. /d. at 174-75. 
45. Id. at 175. 
46. /d. at 177. 
47. Mt Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
48. /d. at 281. 
49. /d. 
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teacher, non-certified staff, and students.50 The last straw came during 
his last semester of teaching. 
During that semester, Doyle's principal circulated a memo suggesting 
that public support for school bond issues was directly related to teacher 
dress and appearance.51 Doyle telephoned a local disc jockey and 
conveyed the substance of the memorandum. 52 The radio station ran the 
adoption of a new dress code for teachers as a news item.53 Doyle 
apologized to his principal for the incident, conceding that he should 
have first addressed his concern to the principal rather than going first to 
the media.54 A month later, when the superintendent made his annual 
recommendations to the school board for rehiring the next year, Doyle 
was among ten teachers he recommended not be rehired. 55 
Per the usual due process, Doyle requested the reasons for the non-
renewal of his contract. 56 The superintendent responded that Doyle had 
"a notable lack of tact in handling professional matters" that left "much 
doubt" as to his "sincerity in establishing good school relationships."57 
In illustration of that professional failing, the superintendent cited a 
disciplinary incident with an obscene gesture and the telephone call to 
the radio station.58 The school board adopted the superintendent's 
recomn1endations.59 Doyle sued.60 
Because Doyle was a non-tenured teacher at the time of his dismissal, 
he could have been non-renewed for no reason whatsoever but not in 
retaliation for his constitutionally protected right of speech under the 
First Amendment.61 In reliance on its earlier reasoning in Pickering, the 
Supreme Court examined the balancing of the teacher's right as a citizen 
to cornment on matters of public concern in tension with the school 
board's duty, as employer, to promote the efficiency of its educational 
50. Doyle argued with another teacher who then slapped him. /d. The administration suspended 
both teachers for a day, but the association engaged in a walkout, resulting in the administration lifting 
the suspensions. /d. Doyle also argued with cafeteria employees about the amount of spaghetti they 
served him, referred to students as "sons of bitches" during a disciplinary incident, and gestured 
obscenely at a couple of girls who disobeyed him during his cafeteria duty. /d. at 281-82. 
51. !d. at 282. 
52. /d. 
53. /d. 
54. /d. 
55. /d. 
56. /d. 
57. /d. 
58. ld. at 282-83. 
59. /d. at 282. 
60. See id. at 283. 
61. !d. at 283-84. 
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services.62 The Court detem1ined that Doyle had violated no school 
board policy when he passed along the substance of the memo and that 
the school board conceded that its retaliatory response was nothing other 
than a reaction to the memo's public disclosure~63 Thus, the Court 
accepted the district court's determination that the First Amendment 
protected Doyle's speech.64 
The point of departure between the district court and the Supreme 
Court was the weight to be given the school board's decision in light of 
the importance of retaining teachers. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist-
writing for the Court emphasized that, but for the school board's 
action, Doyle would have been granted tenure~65 When such important 
decisions are made, he opined, the school board should be given the 
opportunity to justify its decision on lawful grounds; stated differently, 
he said the_ school board should be given the opportunity to show that it 
would have reached the same decision even without the First 
Amendment-related behavior.66 The Court justified this shifting of 
burdens to prevent a teacher from taking advantage of a perhaps minor 
First Amendment issue to retain the same employment status, especially 
where, as in this case, a permanency of employment was at stake.67 
Thus, after a plaintiff-teacher carries his burden of proving that his 
conduct was protected by the First Amendment and that his conduct was 
a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision, the defendant 
school board must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it 
would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the 
protected conduct in order to prevail. 68 After deciding that teacher 
expression, like public statements, was protected by the First 
Amendment, the Court next turned to teacher speech on the job.69 
In Givhan v~ Western Line Consolidated School District, the non-
renewal of Bessie Givhan's contract as a junior high English teacher was 
prompted by her complaints and criticisms of school district 
employment policies and practices that she perceived to be racially 
62., 1d. at 284. 
63. !d. 
·64. /d. 
65. /d. at 286. 
66. /d. at 287. Rehnquist's statements are unclear on whether the fact that Doyle was on the cusp 
of tenure was significant, but it seemed to be. 
67. ld. at 285. 
68. /d. at 287. Ultimately, the school board was able to do just that, justified by the Sixth Circuit 
as Doyle's failing of having a "quick temper." Doyle v. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 670 
F.2d59, 61 (6th Cir. 1982). 
69. 439 u.s. 410 (1979). 
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discriminatory.70 The sticking point in. what would ordinarily be an 
open-and-shut First Amendment retaliation case was that Givhan had 
made her complaints privately to her principal, behind closed doors, and 
those sessions were perceived by the principal as "petty and 
unreasonable," "insulting," "loud," "arrogant,'' and "hostile."71 Th.e 
Fifth Circuit decision had favored the school district, in part because of 
the alleged effect the exchanges had on the working relationship 
between Givhan and her employer.72 The Supreme Court, however, 
pointed out that the principal was not an unwilling participant in the 
exchanges, having invited Givhan into his office for these discussions.73 
Consequently, Givhan's private expressions were constitutionally 
protected. 74 
So up to Givhan, teachers primarily, although not exclusively, had 
taken the lead in forging legal protections for public employees who 
engaged in First Amendment speech. An attorney case would throw a 
monkey-wrench in the works. 
C. In-Flight Adjustments 
In 1983, Connick v. Myers75 confused matters. Connick involved the 
firing of an Assistant District Attorney in the District Attorney's Office 
in New Orleans.76 Sheila Myers tried criminal cases as an Assistant in 
the New Orleans District Attorney's Office for five and a half years 
when she was transferred to a different section of the criminal court. 77 
She was unhappy about the transfer and made her views plain to several 
supervisors in the office, including Connick, the then-District 
Attorney.78 As a part of these discussions, Myers expressed her 
concerns about other office matters.79 During one such conversation, 
70. /d. at412-13. 
71. !d. 
72. !d. at 414-15. 
73. ld. at 415. 
74. The case was ultimate-ly remanded for consideration under the Mt. Healthy v. Doyle principle 
to detennine whether the school board's non-renewal action was primarily motivated by Givhan's 
protected expression. /d. at 417. 
75. 461 u.s. 138 (1983). 
76. Although assistant district atto·meys served at the pleasure of the District Attorney, id. at 140, 
even attorneys serving at the Will of their employer cannot be punished for exercising their 
constitutionally protected rights, id. at 142. 
77. ld. at 140. 
78. !d. 
79. /d. at 141. When one of her supervisors disagreed that her concerns were shared by Qthers in 
the office, Myers told him she would do research on the matter. /d. Later that night and during the next 
morning, Myers compiled a questionnaire about office morale, the office transfer policy, confidence in 
1294 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
Connick continued to urge her to accept the transfer.80 Myers told 
Connick she would consider it, and Connick left the office.81 Myers 
then distributed a questionnaire she had compiled on other office matters 
to fifteen other assistant district attorneys.82 When one of the 
supervisors notified Connick that Myers was instigating a "mini-
insurrection," Connick returned to the office and fired her for refusing to 
accept the transfer and for insubordination in her distribution of the 
questionnaire.83 This questionnaire would become the cause celebre in 
this case: was Myers exercising her First Amendment rights in the 
distribution of this questionnaire because it represented a matter of 
public concem?84 ' 
Justice White, in his majority opinion, started as the Pickering Court 
did, decrying the republic's early dogma that public employees owed a 
duty of loyalty to their employer. 85 This dogma came to a head in the 
1950s and 1960s, in the wake of the "Red Scare," as states attempted to 
force public employees to sign loyalty oaths or otherwise face 
dismissal. 86 By then, the Court's jurisprudence protected the rights of 
public employees to participate in public affairs without fear of 
discharge or similar punishment: "The First Amendment 'was fashioned 
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people. '"87 However, 
supervisors, and similar concerns for distribution to other staff members, including "whether employees 
felt pressured to work in political campaigns." /d. Question 11 asked, "Do you ever feel pressured to 
work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates?" /d. at 155 (appendix to opinion 
of the court). 
80. /d. at 141. 
81. /d. 
82. ld. 
83. /d. 
84. See id. at 141-42. 
85. /d. at 143-44. As famously stated by Justice Holmes, "'[a] policeman may have a 
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.'" /d. (quoting 
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N .. E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892)). Holmes evidently envisioned the 
employment decision as being rather one-sided in favor of the employer: 
There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his 
constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied tenns of his 
contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the tenns which 
are .offered. him. On .the . .same .. principle. the city .may .impose .. any .reasonable .condition 
upon holding offices within its control. This condition seems to us reasonable, if that be 
a question open to revision here. 
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N .E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892). Ironically, Holmes was also 
an early proponent of the right of workers to organize into private associations. See, e.g., Plant v. 
Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1016 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 
1081-82 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
86. Connick, 461 U.S. at 144; see, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
87. Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957)). 
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My,ers's speech hit a snag: it did not appear to fall under this general 
rubric of "public concern. ,s-s 
Justice White's paradigm for protected speech included examining 
whether her speech was related to any political, social, or community 
concern worthy of protection. 89 If not, then a govermnent employer had 
greater latitude in dismissing a government employee without the 
"intrusive oversight" of the courts:90 
We hold ... that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon 
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only 
of personal interest, absent th.e most unusual circumstances, a federal 
court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a 
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the 
employee's behavior.91 
White then outlined a process for detertnining when speech is a matter 
of public concern, a question of law for the court92 That process for 
reviewing the facts in the record required an inquiry as to the speech's 
content, form and context.93 The record as a whole in the instant case 
indicated that most of the matters contained in Myers's questionnaire 
were not matters of public concern because they dealt with matters of 
internal office affairs.94 One matter, however, touched on a public 
concern: whether the assistant district attorneys felt pressure to work on 
political campaigns.95 
The next step of the inquiry was the balance of the government's 
interest dismissing the employee.96 In making that assessment also a 
question of law for the Court97 Justice White quoted Justice Powell 
from an earlier case: 
To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have-wide discretion 
and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. 
This includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct 
hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged 
retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can 
88. Id. at 148. 
89. Id. at 146. 
90. /d. Speech on private matters might also be protected under circumstances not present in this 
case. /d. at 147. 
91. /d. at 147 (citing Bishop v. Wood~ 426 U.S. 341,349-50 (1976)). 
92. ld. at 147-48 & n.7. 
93. /d. at 148 .. 
94. ld: at 148-49. 
95. /d. at t 49. The problem hinted at coercion of public employees' beliefs for fear of 
retaliation. /d. 
96. /d. 
97. ld. at 150 n.IO. 
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adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place, foster 
dishartnony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of any office or 
agency.98 
In examining this management prerogative, the Court acknowledged that 
there was little evidence that Myers's questionnaire occasioned any 
disruption to the workplace.99 In addition, its distribution did not disturb 
Myers's ability to function in her job.100 However, the Court latched 
onto her supervisors' judgment that the questionnaire's distribution was 
"an act of insubordination which interfered with working 
relationships."101 Ultimately, the questions themselves had the potential 
to sour what should otherwise be a close working relationship between 
and among attorneys and their supervisors.102 
Thus, reduced to its essence, Myers's expression was merely "an 
employee grievance concerning internal office policy" for which she 
could be dismissed because of its disruptive potential. 103 Thus, a thin-
skinned employer was granted greater credence than his employee's 
First Amendment rights in a matter of public concern. 
The case that put some-employee perspective into the analysis after 
Connick's employer perspective is Rankin v. McPherson. 104 Ardith 
McPherson was a nineteen-year-old deputy constable assigned to 
clerical work in the office of Constable Rankin of Harris County, Texas, 
on March 30, 1981.105 On that day, John Hinckley, Jr~ attempted to 
assassinate then-President Ronald Reagan. 106 After hearing the news on 
an office radio, McPherson discussed the news with a co-worker who 
was also apparently her boyfriend in the context of the President's 
efforts to cut back welfare payments, Medicaid benefits, and the food-
stamp program. 107 At the tail end of the conversation, McPherson said 
something to the following effect: "I said, shoot, if they go for him 
98. /d. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the result in part)). 
99. /d. at 152. 
100. /d.at153. 
101. Id. at lSL Myers's supervisors' notion of what constituted "insubordination" seems to have 
little conne_ction to its meaning: '~disobedience to constituted authority. Refusal to obey some orde_r 
which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed. Tenn imports a willful or intentional 
distegard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer.'' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 550-
51 (abr. 6th ed. 1991). The record before the Court provided no facts that would indicate Myers's 
questiQnnaire was insubordinate in that she refused no order. 
102. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. 
I 03. !d. at 154. 
104~ 483 u.s. 378 (1987). 
I 05. !d. at 38Q-81. 
106. /d. at 381. 
107. /d. 
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again, I hope they get him." 108 Another co-worker overheard 
McPherson's remark and told Constable Rankin. 109 Rankin sutnmoned 
McPherson to his office whereupon McPherson admitted the statement, 
but qualified it by saying, "I didn't mean anything by it."11° Constable 
Rankin fired McPherson on the spot. 111 
Ultimately ruling in favor of McPherson's exercise of free speech, the 
Court again relied on Pickering, weighing "the interests of the 
[employee], as a citizen, in connnenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency 
of the public services it performs through its employees."112 Justice 
Marshall, writing for the Court, cautioned that the power of the state to 
fire employees is a potent method for stifling free speech: "Vigilance is 
necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over 
employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions 
but simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees' 
speech."113 Stated differently, under the First Amendment, employers 
may not fire emloyees merely to silence contrary points of view. 
In addressing the threshold question of whether McPherson's 
statement was a matter of public concern, the Court applied Connick's 
content, form, and manner analysis to the record. 114 That analysis 
revealed that McPherson's statement was a matter of public concern, 
imbedded as it was in the underlying conversation about the President's 
policies and in the radio bulletin about the assassination attempt. 115 
Although the comments were ill-advised and controversial, the character 
of the statement insofar as it did not amount to an unlawful death 
threat was well within the scope of acceptable debate in this country, 
where "[ d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open, and ... may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."116 
Completing the Pickering analysis was the Court's examination of the 
state's interest in McPherson's expression and whether her speech 
interfered with the efficient provision of public services. The Court 
108. /d. 
109. /d. 
II 0. /d. at 382. 
Ill. /d. 
112. /d. at 384 (alteration in original) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 39I U.S. 563, 568 
(1968)). 
113. ld. 
114. /d. at 384-85. 
115. /d. at 386-87. 
116. /d. at 387 (second alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
270 ( 1964)). 
• 
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reviewed the statement's manner, time, place, and context whether her 
speech had a detrimental impact on any close working relationships 
dependent upon personal loyalty and confidence; whether it impeded her 
own duties; or whether it interfered with the regular operation of the 
office. 117 First, the record was devoid of evidence that McPherson's 
statement interfered with the workplace functions. 118 Indeed, Rankin 
testified that he had not even considered workplace functions in his 
dismissal decision. 119 In addition, McPherson's statement was made in a 
private conversation to which the public had no access. 120 But for a co-
worker's overhearing the comment, it had no impact on the efficient 
functioning of the office. 121 
Rankin had merely decided that McPherson was unfit to work in his 
office because he disliked the content of her remark. 122 Such a bad 
management decision was insufficient state interest to support 
McPherson's discharge: 
We cannot believe that every employee in Constable Rankin's office, 
whether computer operator, electrician, or file clerk, is equally required, 
on pain of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of being 
interpreted by the Constable as an indication that the employee may be 
unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency. At some point, 
such concerns are so removed from the effective functioning of the public 
employer that they cannot prevail over the free speech rights of the public 
employee. 123 
As Justice Powell asserted in his concurring opinion, "The risk that a 
single, offhand comment directed to only one other worker will lower 
morale, disrupt the work force, or otherwise undermine the mission of 
the office borders on the fanciful." 124 
So the Court seemed to have reached a practical balance to free 
speech, recognizing that bad management practices should not govern 
whether public employees could feel free to speak. Rather, a mature 
inquiry into whether the speech actually affected the efficient 
functioning of the government office would dictate whether a 
government employee was being appropriately disciplined or 
inappropriately retaliated against. Garcetti changed that balance. 
117. /d. 
118. /d. at389. 
119. /d. 
120. /d. 
121. /d. 
122. /d. at 390. 
123. /d. at 391 (footnote omitted). 
124. /d. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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D. Losing the Tiles on Reentry 
In May 2006, the Court took the unprecedented step of allowing 
public employers to retaliate against public employees for speech~related 
activities, even if the speech was on a matter of ~ublic concern, if those 
activities arose during the course of their jobs. 1 5 Garcetti involved a 
dispute in the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office where 
Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney:26 Ceballos was a 
calendar deputy in the office's Pomona branch.127 In February, 2000, a 
defense attorney advised Ceballos that an affidavit supporting a search 
warrant in a pending case was filled with inaccuracies and that he 
intended to challenge the warrant. 128 Because calendar deputies 
sometimes reviewed pending_ cases, Ceballos examined the affidavit in 
question and determined that it was replete with serious 
misrepresentations_l29 He followed up with the affiant, a deputy sheriff 
for the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department, but was unsatisfied 
with the explanation for the inaccuracies in the document. 130 So 
Ceballos informed his supervisors of the issue then wrote a disposition 
memorandum of the problem. 131 A meeting was then convened to 
discuss the affidavit. 132 In attendance were Ceballos, his supervisors, 
and members of the sheriffs department. 133 The meeting became 
heated. 134 When the district attorney proceeded to prosecute the case 
despite the poor quality of the affidavit, the defense called Ceballos to 
testify about his concems.135 The trial court ultimately denied the 
defense's challenge to the warrant. 136 Afterward, Ceballos was 
subjected to several retaliatory employment actions, including 
reassignment, transfer, and the denial of a promotion.137 Ceballos sued, 
asserting that his public employer had violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 138 
As usual, Justice Kennedy relied on the two-step Pickering balancing 
125. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
126. /d. at 413. 
127. /d. 
128. /d. at 413-14. 
129. !d. at 414. 
130. /d. 
131. /d. 
132. /d. 
133. /d. 
134. /d. 
13 5. I d. at 4 14-15. 
136. /d. at 415. 
137. /d. 
138. /d. 
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analysis to set the threshold question in determining "whether [Ceballos] 
spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concem.''139 Ifthat threshold is 
crossed, then "[t]he question becomes whether the relevant government 
entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently 
from any other member of the general public.''140 
Justice Kennedy then divided the Pickering threshold analysis into an 
additional two-part inquiry: ''We hold that when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution 
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.''141 If 
the employee cannot traverse that step, then there is no further inquiry 
and the speech is not protected. 142 In analyzing the facts in the record, 
the Court concluded that Ceballos composed his memorandum while 
acting within his professional duties: investigating charges, supervising 
attorneys, and preparing filings. 143 His memo was about the disposition 
of a pending case and therefore was within his official duties as a 
g,overnment employee. 144 
The Court did not "articulate a comprehensive framework for 
defining the scope of an employee;s duties in cases where there is room 
for serious debate." The Court rejected, "however, the suggestion that 
employers can restrict employees' rights by creating excessively broad 
job descriptions.''145 What those official duties might be under any 
particular circumstance may be open for debate, but what had previously 
been a question of law in the first prong of the Pickering analysis 
became a question of fact: 
The proper inquiry is a practical one. Formal job descriptions often bear 
little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected to 
perform, and the listing of a given task in an employee's written job 
description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that 
co~ducting .the task is within the scoEe of the employee's professional 
duttes for Ftrst Amendment purposes. 1 6 
The Court's analysis of Ceballos's job situation and his speech 
provides some context. He could not be punished just for speaking in 
139 .. /d. at 418 (citing Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968))~ 
140. /d. (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). 
141. /d. at 421 (emphasis added). 
142. Seeid. 
143. /d. at 422. 
144. /d. 
145. !d. at 424 (citing id. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting)). 
146. !d. at 424--25. 
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private rather than in public. 147 Nor could he be punished because the 
subject matter of his speech was within his employment. 148 "The 
controlling factor in Ceballos'[s] case is that his expressions were made 
pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy. . .. Ceballos spoke as a 
prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how 
best to proceed with a pending case .... "149 Thus, the employer's 
ability to retaliate against an employee for such speech "simply reflects 
the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created."150 
So in traversing the current First Amendment tenet, the courts have 
several steps to follow, most of which are dominated not by the speech 
or the employee's rights but by the employer's control of the workplace. 
First, a court will examine the facts for the Garcetti analysis: Did the 
employee speak pursuant to official duties? If not, then the court 
follows the Pickering-Connick analysis: Did the employee speak on a 
matter of public concern? If the employee spoke on a matter of public 
concern, then did the speech outweigh the employer's interest in the 
efficient service of the governmental institution? If so, then the court 
applies the Mt. Healthy analysis: Would the public employer have 
punished the employee anyway? Somewhere in the evolution of this 
test, the matter of public concern has become submerged in the 
employer's three bites at the apple. In the balance between the public 
employer's management rights and the public employee's speech rights, 
the Court greatly tipped the scales for employers. 
II. "WHEN THE (SCHOOL BOARD] DOES IT, THAT MEANS THAT IT Is NOT 
ILLEGAL" 151 
The Garcetti Court's initial analysis on the official duties of a public 
employee in the First Amendment context has tested the abilities of 
courts to determine the exact nature of one's "official'; duties in any 
particular case, especially for school employees. In the near-universal 
absence of written job descriptions, the courts have a tendency to rely on 
the school employer's characterization of the employee's duties. Such 
analysis has garnered three broad categories of speech arising from 
14 7. /d. at 420-21. 
148. /d. at 421. 
149. /d. 
150. /d. at 422 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 
(1995)). 
151. A paraphrase of Richard M. Nixon •s interpretation of Executive power during a 1977 
interview with David Frost: "When the President does it, that means that it is not illegal." James M. 
Naughton, Asserts U.S. Role Was Prolonged by Doves, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at AI. 
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''official'·' duties: speech the teacher ·must do to accomplish the job; 
speech that is job-related; and classroom speech, or academic 
freedom. 152 
A. Official-Duty Speech 
As discussed above, courts' inquiries as to the official duties of a 
sc·hool employee is supposed to be a practical one. And although the 
Court eschewed the necessity of fortnal job descriptions to determine a 
public employee's official duties, it also opened the door for school 
districts to provide a broad description of a school employee's duties. In 
addition, some school employees acknowledged certain tasks were 
within their job duties because they were proud of the care with which 
they did their job and because teachers had not yet been stung by 
Garcetti and the new rules of the game. 
The following cases revolve around school employers' retaliation for 
teacher speech that either fit within traditional official -duties or arose out 
of tasks assigned by the employers. The collection primarily consists of 
teachers without tenure relying on contract renewal for continuing 
employment and school administrators. The status of these people, of 
course, makes them bigger targets for school boards because of the lack 
of contractual and statutory protections. 153 
152. There may have been other legitimate grounds for the· dismissal or other punishment or 
discipline administered in these cases. However, this survey is limited to those matters related to First 
Amendment claims and Garcetti defenses. 
153. Most of the teachers and administrators against whom school boards retaliated did not have 
sufficient tenure rights to protect them. Many teachers are protected from these actions in states where 
"just cause" is a stat\}tory precondition for discharging or otherwise punishing teachers. In other states, 
teachers may be protected by collective bargaining agreements with Hjust cause" provisions for 
discharge and discipline. Unfortunately, not -all teachers are covered by either state· tenure or collective 
bargaining acts to protect their rights. Those are the most vulnerable to school board retaliation. 
School administrators are even more \!ulnerable. Indeed, it is the rare occasion that a school 
administrator enjoys any of those protections; they generally are not considered to have any continuing 
contract rights in employment and are not members of any bargaining units that will otherwise protect 
their ·rights. To make matters worse, they do not have a powerful advocacy group that can take on the 
National School Boards Association like the teacher advocacy groups, National Education Association 
and American Federation of Teachers. Unfortunately, many school administrators align themselves with 
school board policy, often espoused by the school board's attorney. But, when push comes to shove, the 
attorneys employed by a school board will heave the school administrator under the bus when things go 
wrong. And school administrator advocacy groups typically offer no more than $10,000 worth of legal 
assistance for job protection attorney fees, apart from professional liability insurance. See American 
Association of School Administrators, Member Benefits and Services~ http://www.aasa.org/member/ 
content.cfm?ItemNumber=2161 &snltemNumber-5763 (last visited June 6, 2007); National Association 
of Elementary School Principals, Member Services & Benefits, http://www.naesp.org/ 
ContentLoad.do?contentld=377 (last, visited Mar. 8, 2007); National Association of Secondary School 
Principals, Legal Fee Re.imbursement Program) http://www .principals.org/s_nassp/ 
sec.asp?CID= I 038&DID=54174 (last visited Mar. 8, 2007). Unfortunately, that is a mere drop in the 
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Not atypical of the bunch is Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County Board of 
Education. 154 Angela Gilder-Lucas was a non-tenured high school 
science teacher whose extracurricular duties included acting as sponsor 
of the junior varsity cheerleading squad.155 After a couple of parents 
complained about the fairness of try-outs for the squad, Gilder-Lucas's 
principal asked her to complete a questionnaire that included questions 
concerning the try-outs; in response to the questions, Gilder-Lucas 
raised her own concerns about the try-outs} 56 The principal then told 
Gilder-Lucas her contract would. not be renewed}57 Gilder-Lucas filed 
suit. 158 The Eleventh Circuit, relying on Garcetti, detertnined that 
Gilder-Lucas had no First Amendment protections for her responses to 
the questionnaire as requested by her supervisor because she had 
been asked to fill out the questionnaire as the cheerleader sponsor and 
she was therefore not speaking as citizen.159 Responding to a school 
administration-drafted questionnaire would hardly seem to be an official 
duty of any extracurricular faculty sponsor unless it was a common 
practice with the football coach, the Academic Decathlon sup.ervisor, 
and the National Honor Society faculty advisor. However, refusing to 
respond to the questionnaire would have been insubordination. 
Consequently, whether this was really within her job description was 
irrelevant to the extent the school administration had expanded Gilder-
Lucas's official duties by giving her a direct order she dared not refuse. 
Naive belief in the honor of doing one's job properly propelled 
several school employees into the unemployment line, especially over 
fiscal mismanagement. Accountability for expenditures under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)160 especially was the 
focus of a handful of retaliation cases. In Yatzus v. Appoquinimink 
Sch,o,ol District, Olga Yatzus, a school psychologist with more than 
twenty years of experience, had been hired by Appoquinimink School 
District. 161 During_ the course of that employment, Yatzus openly 
expressed her concerns about the school district's special education 
bucket to'the taxpayer-funded legal representation school boards may access in legally justifying their 
retaliation. Administrators' tenuous job security may account for the fact that there are nearly as many 
administrators as teachers against whom school boards have retaliated for speaking on the job under 
Garcetti, particularly about matters that one would assume should be protected as matters of public 
concem. 
154. 186 F. App'x 885 ( llth Cir. 2006). 
155. /d. at 886. 
156. /d. 
157. /d. 
158. /d. 
159. /d. at 887. 
160. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
161. 458 F. Supp. 2d 235, 239 (D. Del. 2006). 
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program. 162 She wrote a letter to her superintendent about her concerns, 
emphasizing the school district was not complying with testing 
requirements for special education students. 163 Yatzus also 
corresponded through her personal e-mail to a group of parents of 
special education students and assisted them in claims filed with the 
federal Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights. 164 At the end 
of the school year, the school district's Human Resources director 
informed Y atzus that the school board had not renewed her contract for 
the following year. 165 Among other grounds, Yatzus sued the school 
district on First Amendment grounds, claiming the school district had 
retaliated for her correspondence to district administrators and her 
assistance to the parents group.166 In her deposition, Yatzus asserted 
that her correspondence and her work with the parents were part of her 
job responsibilities as a school psychologist, '"to report what [she] 
perceived as illegal behavior' and to assist parents with the [Office of 
Civil Rights] complaints."167 That evidence was enough for the district 
court to detertnine, as a matter of law, that Garcetti compelled the same 
result for Yatzus: Y atzus was acting as a public employee during her 
official duties and not as a private citizen on a matter of public concern, 
and the school board was well within its rights to discharge her. 168 
Less than a month later, the same federal district upheld the contract 
non-renewal of another school psychologist in Houlihan v. Sussex 
Technical School District. 169 In Houlihan, the psychologist 
continuously tried to bring the attention of the school district as well as 
of the special education supervisor to deficiencies in the school's 
compliance with the IDEA. 170 The school board eventually voted to not 
renew her contract. 171 The district court ultimately granted the school 
district's motion to dismiss the psychologist's First Amendment 
162. !d. at 241. 
163. /d. 
164. /d. 
165. /d. at 242. In addition, Yatzus had the unfortunate experience of having her supervisor make 
unwanted sexual advances to her. !d. at 239. After the school district investigated and disciplined the 
supervisor, Yatzus's professional life took a tum for the worse, with the superintendent seeming to bird-
dog her every move and issuing numerous reprimands to her file. !d. at 240 41. 
166. /d. at 242. 
167. !d. at 245 (first alteration in original). 
168. /d. Yatzus's deposition was taken before Garcetti was handed down. !d. at 246. Obviously, 
Yatzus was attempting to establish that she was acting on a matter of public concern when she was 
deposed. See id. After Garcetti, Yatzus attempted to qualify the language in her deposition with an 
affidavit. /d. She was unsuccessful. /d. at 24 7. 
169. 461 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D. Del. 2006). 
170. /d. at 256. 
171. /d. 
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retaliation claim because her complaint had alleged that "her job duties 
. . . 
always entailed reporting alleged incidences of IDEA 
noncompliance."172 With such a clear-cut concession, her reports were 
.deemed within her official duties, and Garcetti militated that she had no 
claim as a matter of law under the First Amendment. 173 
In Ryan v. Shawnee Mission Unified School District No. 512, 
similarly treated was a physical therapist who advocated for more 
physical therapy for special education students in her school district. 174 
Her ·speech "owe[d] its existence· to" her professional responsibilities, 
and hence she was speaking as an employee like Ceballos and not as a 
citizen. 175 She was not protected from retaliation under the First 
Amendment 176 
Reporting mismanagement of funds in another federally funded 
program was also often within the official duties Barbara Casey, 
Superintendent of West Las Vegas Independent School District for 
about fifteen months. 177 One of her administrative responsibilities was 
acting as chief executive officer of the school district's Head Start 
program. 178 During Casey's tenure, the Head Start director passed along 
information concerning funding problems with the program because of 
participants' underreporting income to become eligible_l79 Casey 
reported these problems several times to the school board president and 
the board itself. 180 When the school board failed to act, Casey instructed 
the director to report the problems to the federal Head Start regional 
office, which investigated and ordered the school district to reimburse 
more than half a million dollars.181 For all her efforts, the school board 
demoted her to assistant superintendent then refused to renew her 
172. /d. at 260. 
173. Id Ironically, the court refused to dismiss her complaint on the count asserting retaliation 
under the Rehabilitation Act because she was advocating on behalf of the disabled, actions protected 
from retaliation by the Act itself. !d. at 257-59; see also Ryan v. Shawnee Mission Unified Sch. Dist. 
No. 512, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1233; 1259 (D. Kan. 2006). In the Ryan case, a physical therapist was forced 
to resign after a series of events during which she advocated for increased services to special education 
students. /d. at 1239-45. These activitie.s were. protected from retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, 
and summary judgment was entered in favor of the therapist. /d. 
174. 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1249. 
175. /d. at 1251. Her controversial speech occurred in several contexts, most of which were 
actually while doing her job: team meetings; phone calls and e-.·mails concerning student equipment 
needs; staff meetings; and the like in communicating inforrnation critical for her providing services. /d. 
at 1249-51. 
176~ /d. at 1251. 
177. Casey v. W. Las Vegas lndep. Sch. Dist, 473 F.3d 1323, 1325 (I Oth Cir. 2007). 
178. /d. 
179. /d. at 1326. 
180. /d. 
181. /d. 
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contract for the following year. 182 On the school board's motion for 
summary judgment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit deterrnined that Garcetti mandated Casey had no First 
Amendment protection for her reporting of the fiscal problems in the 
Head Start program.183 Because she had a duty to report financial 
wrongdoing to the federal program, she was acting within her official 
duties. 184 
Another instance of punishing an educational employee for Head 
Start fiscal problems is Dennis v. Putnam County School District, where 
the fiscal officer of a Head Start program in Georgia was forced to 
resign her post. 185 She alleged she was being made a scapegoat for 
reporting her concerns that the Head Start director and his executive 
assistant made unauthorized purchases with federal funds. 186 The 
district court determined that, based on her duties as fiscal officer, 
reporting financial fraud was within her official although 
unenunciated duties as a matter of law because her report was 
"related" to her official tasks: paying bills, requesting funds, approving 
purchase requisitions and orders, reconciling bank statements, 
maintaining accurate records, and carrying out the day-to-day fiscal 
operations. 187 Furthermore, the fiscal officer conceded in her deposition 
that reporting financial misconduct was part of her job. 188 
Consequently, Garcetti removed her First Amendment protection.189 
Norma Cavazos was a high school principal against whom a school 
board retaliated when the board reassigned her to another school after 
she disciplined the son of the school board's vice president and reported 
him to the local police officials. 190 Because disciplining students was 
182. /d. at 1327. 
183. /d. at 1331. 
184. /d. 
185. No. 5:05-CV-07, 2007 WL 891517, at *1-3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2007). 
186. /d. 
187. !d. at *4. 
188. /d. 
189. ld. at *5. A similar result inured to a university employee whose official duties required she 
report mismanagement and fraud in student financial aid files. Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755 
(II th Cir. 2006). Her contract was not renewed after she reported her concerns to the president of the 
university. /d. at 7 61-62. 
190. Cavazos v. Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist.,210 F. App'x 414, 415 (5th Cir. 2006). This 
discipline was imposed after he was apprehended on school grounds with marijuana in his possession. 
Cavazos v. Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 948,952-53 (W.O. Tex. 2005), ajJ'd, 210 F. 
App'x 414 (5th Cir. 2006). See also Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist., No. CVOS-272, 2007 WL 
420256 (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 2007) (holding that a school safety specialist's duties included speech about 
student safety and discipline); Cole v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., No. CCB-05-1579, 2006 WL 
3626888, at *6 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2006) (holding that a school bus driver was not protected under the 
First Amendment for her complaints about discipline problems and bus safety because they were 
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within her official duties. as principal, Cavazos was unprotected pursuant 
to Garcetti~ 191 Unfortunately, the fact-based analysis for this official 
duties analysis is unclear, even from the more detailed district court 
opinion, and was reached as a matter oflaw. 192 
In Morris-Hayes v. Board of Education of Chester Union Free School 
District, a New York court followed, more closely than the· Cavazos 
court, the Garcetti caution to review the facts in the record to conduct an 
official duties analysis. In this case, a principal in New York had a 
couple of problems that resulted in her losing her job.193 One of those 
problems was that, because of the potential for favoritism, she refused a 
school board member's request for special class placement.194 In one of 
several opinions issued in that case, the Second Circuit remanded the 
matter to the district court for additional fact-finding to determine if the 
principal's acts were within her official duties for purposes of applying 
Garcetti to the proceedings. 195 Although it would seem fairly obvious 
that special class placements would be within a principal's typical 
official duties, the court at least did the principal the courtesy of treating 
the matter ,as a question of fact. 
In D'Angelo v. School Board, the official duties fact inquiry resolved 
itself against the principal with his admission that, when he pursued 
charter conversion for his Florida high school, he was acting as a 
principal. 196 Because of an unsatisfactory appraisal of his school's 
performance, the newly hired D'Angelo pursued state procedures for 
converting to a charter school, including attending a seminar, leading 
staff meetings, and forming study committees. 197 He undertook these 
actions because "in good conscience [he] could not continue the practice 
of providing an inferior e·ducational opportunity[, and he] would be 
remiss in [his] duties . , ~ if [he] did not explore any and all possibilities 
to improve the quality of education at [the school].''198 He was 
tertninated for his efforts then he filed suit, asserting that he was fired 
for his speech associated with his charter school conversion efforts. The 
consistent with her official duties). 
191. Cavazos, 210 F. App'x at415. 
192. See Cavazos, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 959-60. Pe.rhaps of most significance is that the student's 
discipline was meted out in accordance with school district policy. !d. at 953. Otherwise, the Fifth 
Circuit seemed to detennine Cavazos's duties as a matter of law; contrary to Garcetti's instruction .. 
193. Morris~Hayes v. Bd. ofEduc., 423 F.3d 153, 155-156 (2dCir. 2005). 
194. ld. The principal was also a Major in the United States Army Reserve, and some individual 
school members expressed concerns about the amount of time her military obligations took~ /d. at 155. 
195. Morris-Hayes v. Bd. of Educ., 211 F. App'x 28, 29 (2d Cir. 2007). 
196. 497 F .3d 1203 (11th Cir; 2007). 
197. /d. at 1206. 
198. /d. (third, fi.fth, and sixth alterations in origina1). 
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Eleventh Circuit rewarded his conscientiousness by denying him First 
Amendment protection, holding that his admissions nullified the need to 
actually examine his official duties. 199 
Only federal law prevents a school board from retaliating against 
educators for actually fulfilling their duties. A small handful of federal 
civil rights statutes have anti-retaliation provisions: persons who have 
brought complaints under, or otherwise criticized the conduct of, a 
federal program may not be punished by their employer.20° For 
instance, Olga Yatzus was unsuccessful in fending off discipline under 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act but was more successful 
in proceeding with her claim that the school district retaliated against her 
in violation of Title VII: she had reported her supervisor's sexual 
misconduct.201 The IDEA does not have anti-retaliation provisions but 
Title VII does.202 
Also inoculated from Garcetti by federal law was Cheryl Peters, 
Director of Gifted Education and Magnet Programs, whose contract was 
not renewed.203 The impetus for the non-renewal was Peters's 
opposition to racially discriminatory school board practices.204 Because 
Peters's lawsuit implicated both Title VI and First Amendment 
retaliation, the court refused to separate the two for purposes of the 
Garcetti analysis.205 The court did not see Garcetti's changing the Title 
VI jurisprudence on retaliation; hence, the court's threshold 
consideration had to hinge on the civil rights law and not on the First 
Amendment and the employee's official duties.206 
Given how little time had passed between Garcetti and when these 
cases were handed down, the courts evidently had little time to prepare 
for the Garcetti inquiry into official-duty status of the speech. As a 
199. /d. at 1210. This was clearly an instance where a plaintiff got caught in the notch between 
his teunination in 2004 and Garcetti's hand-down date. The principal and amici attempted to ameliorate 
the damage of his admissions by characterizing them as "moral obligations as a human being and not his 
responsibilities as a principal," but the court was having none of it, instead relying on the mechanical 
application of the official-duties analysis of Garcetti. /d. at 121 0-11. 
200. For example, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, "[n]o person shall discriminate 
against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this 
chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
·investigation, ·proceeding·, or ·hearing under·this chapter." 42 ·U·.S:C. ·§·l2203(a)-(2000). 
201. Yatzus v. Appoquinimink Sch. Dist., 458 F. Supp. 2d 235, 244 (D. Del. 2006). 
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). 
203. Peters v. Sch. Bd., No. 2:0lcv120, 2007 WL 295618, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 26, 2007). 
204. /d. 
205. ld. at *3. 
206. /d. Other anti-retaliation provisions can be found under Title IX, 20 U .S.C. § 1681 (2000), 
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (2000 & Supp. V 2005), and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
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consequence, some courts took liberties with the nature of the inquiry as 
a question of fact to reach ill-advised and presumptuous decisions as a 
matter of law. In addition, the respective plaintiffs often found 
themselves confronting a Garcetti defense mid-litigation, a defense for 
which they had clearly not prepared themselves, viz.. many of them 
proudly conceded that these instances of speech arose out of their duties, 
. . . 
taking pride in doing a job well done in the face of retaliatory actions by 
their employers. Now, much to their horror, they have to argue to the 
court to save their jobs that they have minimal job expectations and 
that they do only the minimal job expectations so that any speech for 
which they may be punished will not be characterized as official-duty 
speech. Chances are good that plaintiffs will become more sophisticated 
in the future. Chances are less good, unfortunately, that courts will be 
any better prepared to differentiate among educator tasks in order to 
winnow out only the official-duty speeches, perhaps because the whole 
exercise is so counterintuitive. This problem is especially exacerbated 
by the inability of courts to decide whether to protect job-related 
speech as opposed to official-duty speech -or not. 
B. HNo Good Deed Goes Unpunished":207 Job-Related Speech 
As alluded to in the previous section, courts since Garcetti have 
exhibited a willingness to stretch the meaning of a school employee's 
official duties to Justify school board retaliations. In doing so, they have 
created a twilight zone of speech that is not really official-duty speech. 
This category of job~related yet not official-duty speech has developed 
from either a too-broad job description by the employer2°8 or from a 
decision by a court as a question of law as to what the employee 
should have done on the job rather than what the employee was required 
to do. The lengths to which courts went to justify the school boards' 
actions are truly interesting. They went outside the traditional notion of 
school employees' official duties and explained that those employees 
would not have had the wherewithal to speak on the subject matter at all 
but for their status as school employees. 
Perhaps the starting point for demarcating_ job-related speech as 
distinct from official-duty speech is to the examine cases in which the 
207. This quotation has been variously attributed to Oscar Wilde, ~ee The Phrase Finder, Re: Hno 
good deed goes unpunished," http://www.phrases.org.uk/bulletin_board/27/messages/317.html (last 
visited June 4, 2007), and to Clare Booth Luce, see BrainyQuote~ Clare Booth Luce Quotes, 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/c/clarebooth 1255ll.html (last visited June 4, 2007). 
208. "We reject, however, the suggestion tha.t employers can restrict employees' rights by creating 
excessively broad job descriptions.'' Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 4 I 0, 424 (2006) (citing id. at 431 n.2 
(Souter, J., dissenting)). 
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educator prevailed. For instance, the district court in Pittman v .. 
Cuyahoga Valley Career Center chose to interpret Garcetti's official 
duties inquiry rather broadly in the case of a substitute teacher who, 
among other acts of expression, wrote a memorandum to his 
superintendent concerning parking lot safety.209 The court decided that 
Garcetti's inquiry mandated the court to look at whether the speech was 
required to determine whether it was an official duty.210 Pittman's 
memorandum concerning parking lot safety was not required by his 
official duties, and therefore Garcetti did not apply.211 Similarly 
decided was McMahon v. New York City Board of Education, where a 
high school chemistry teacher was not constrained by Garcetti inasmuch 
as his barrage of letters was not within his official duties and, but for a 
few instances dealing with matters of public concern, primarily dealt 
with his personal animus against school administrators.212 And oddly 
decided was Montie v. Westwood Heights School District, in which a 
teacher's probationary contract was not renewed because he wore a T-
shirt to school that said "Working Without a Contract."213 The district 
court mentioned the recently decided Garcetti case, and then it 
proceeded to start the analysis from the point of establishing_ that 
Montie's speech was on a matter of public concern, presumably 
because as a matter of law union speech is not within a teacher's 
official duties.214 These were the easier questions to resolve for the 
courts involved. Indeed, they seemed to conclude that these educators 
had spoken outside their official duties as a matter of law. 
The more problematic cases are those where the speech is job-related: 
it arises out of information gleaned on the job, but the speech itself is not 
an official duty. In instances where the information was gathered on the 
job but such information-gathering was not an official duty, the courts 
tended to find that Garcetti did not foreclose First Amendment claims. 
For example, the district court in Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consolidated 
209. 451 F. Supp. 2d 905,910-11 (N.D. Ohio 2006). 
210. /d. at 929. 
211. /d. The Pittman court used a "job-relatedness" analysis, id., which would suggest that the 
court was seeking something beyond official duties to support the schoo1 board's position. In any event, 
the court proceeded to look at Pittman's official duties. !d. As it turned out, Pittman's memorandum 
was not on a matter ofpublic concern so the court's· Connick·analysis prohibited ·Pittman from pursuing 
a First Amendment claim on this and other personal issues on which Pittman spoke. /d. at 929~30. 
212. No. CV-01-6205, 2006 WL3680624, at *1, *&-7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006). 
213. 437 F. Supp. 2d 652, 653 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
214. ld. at 654; see also Bowers v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., No. Civ. 3:06CV00041, 
2006 WL 3041269 (W.D. Va. Oct. 24, 2006) (university emp1oyee avoided Garcetti's impact because 
the e-mail she transmitted from her work account was not within her official duties). Montie still lost 
under the Connick analysis, but the opinion suggests that matters of more urgent public_ concern, such as 
labor unrest, merit broader protections than Garcetti offers. Montie, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 654-55. 
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School District Board ofEducation determined that a physical education 
teacher's journal of a team-teacher's absences was outside Garcetti's 
reach: the teacher was not employed to monitor his fellow teacher and 
his official teaching duties did not mandate that he do so.215 Similarly, 
in Black v. Columbus Public Schools, an assistant principal reported that 
her principal was having an affair with a parent volunteer.216 Then she 
was transferred to a less prestigious schoo1.217 In analyzing the sch.ool 
board's motion to file a supplemental motion for summary judgment to 
account for the recently decided Garcetti, the court detertnined that, 
even if the school board had not waived the issue based on Sixth Circuit 
. . 
precedent, it still could not prevail because the assistant had no official 
duties that required her to supervise her principal or even to report 
misconduct of her principal.218 
The court treated the job-related speech for which Superintendent 
Barbara Casey sought First Amendment protection in Casey v. West Las 
Vegas Independent School District in a similar manner to Wilcoxon-.219 
Casey was concerne-d that the school board was violating the New 
Mexico Open Meetings Act by failing to give proper notice.220 She filed 
a written complaint with the New Mexico Attorney General's Office 
when the scho,ol board failed to heed her concems.221 The Attorney 
General's Office-determined that the school board had indeed violated 
the open meetings act and ordered it take corrective action.222 In this 
instance, Garcetti did not foreclose Casey;s reporting problems with the 
open meetings act because that was outside her official duties.223 
According to the record before the court, Casey had no responsibility for 
the board's meetings and was not responsible for the board's compliance 
with the act.224 Hence, she was acting within her protected First 
Amendment right when she reported to the Attorney General's office.225 
Perhaps of greater concern are the courts that examine "job-
relatedness" to slot speech into a teacher's official duties226 or the courts 
215. 437 F. Supp. 2d 235,243 (D. Del. 2006). 
216. No. 2:-96-CV-326, 2006 WL 2385359,at*l (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2006). 
217. /d. at *2. 
218. /d. at *5. 
219. 4 73 F .3d 1323 (I Oth Cir. 2007). 
220. /d. at 1326. 
221. /d. 
222. /d. 
223. /d. at 1332-33. 
224. /d. at 1.332. 
225. /d. at 1332-33. 
226. See, e.g., Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (N.D. Ohio 
2006). 
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that strip protection from '"speech [that has] official significance ... and 
could not have been made by public citizens."227 Such analyses suggest 
that courts go beyond the employee's official duties and analyze speech 
that is just related to employment, relying on information the employee 
would not have had but for the job. This speech is in no way required of 
the job and therefore not within an educator's official duties. However, 
but for the job, the speech would not have occurred. 
Illustrative of this elevation of job-related speech to official-duty 
speech is Williams v. Dallas Independent School District, where a report 
on the alleged misuse of athletic funds was grounds for discharge.228 
Gregory Williams was Athletic Director and Head Football Coach at a 
high school within the Dallas school district.229 Williams, at various 
times, tried to get the office manager to inform him about the state of 
accounts for athletic expenditures, including by a memorandum copied 
to the school principal.230 When Williams received no responses to his 
inquiries, he finally wrote, during football season, a memorandum 
concerning the finances of the athletic department to the principal 
himself.231 Four days later the principal removed Williams as athletic 
director, and in the spring, the school district decided not to renew 
Williams's contract.232 Williams sued, asserting the school district had 
retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment.233 The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the 
school district by relying on Garcetti.234 Although the court determined 
that Williams's official duties did not require him to write a 
memorandum to the principal about the athletic funds, his duties as 
athletic director did encompass the subject matter of the memorandum, 
the daily operations of the high school's athletic department.235 The 
budgetary concerns expressed in the memorandum were not expressed 
as those of a citizen but from a specialized knowledge he only had 
227. Cole v. Anne Arundel County Bd. ofEduc., No. CCB-05-1579, 2006 WL 3626888, at *6 (D. 
Md. Nov. 30, 2006); see also Ward v. Bd. ofTrs. ofChL State Univ., No. 06 C 1360,2007 WL 1512419 
(N.D. Ill. May 22, 2007) (holding that university administrator's retransmission of an e-mail she had 
received concerning criminal allegations about a dean was punishable by Garcetti as she had been 
targeted to receive the original e-mail because of her administrative position). 
228. 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007). 
229. I d. at 690. 
230. ld. 
231. /d. at 690-91. 
232. /d. at 691. The principal was apparently unhappy with the tenor of Williams's memorandum 
when he suggested that he had "found that there is a network of friends and house rules, which govern 
practices here at L.G. Pinkston High School." /d. 
233. !d. 
234. !d. at 692~94. 
235. !d. at 694. 
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because of his job with the school district.236 Thus, the court applied 
Garcetti and rejected Williams's claims.237 
In one of the oddest cases of job-related retaliation, a middle school 
teacher was punished for filing a verbal complaint with the state's 
Department of Children and Families (DCF). Robert Pagani was a 
middle-school science teacher in Connecticut.238 Two middle school 
students advised Pagani that a substitute science teacher had shared with 
students a photograph album that not only memorialized the teacher's 
European trip but also included a nude picture of him with two nude 
females. 239 Pagani reRorted the incident to his principal but was told not 
to report it to DCF. 40 Pagani did so anyway, and there followed a 
bizarre string of events demoting, reassigning, and finally reinstating 
Pagani.241 The district court determined that Pagani was not protected 
because reporting child abuse is mandated by the Connecticut reporting 
statutes and is therefore a legal requirement of teachers' jobs.242 
According to the court, inasmuch as this duty is mandated for teachers, 
Pagani was not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern but 
was acting within his official job duties.243 
The court's reasoning in relying on Garcetti to rule against Pagani's 
First Amendment claim is more than a little confusing. First, the facts 
revealed that Pagani's superiors had told Pagani not to file a report;244 
hence, Pagani's superiors believed such a report was not within his 
official duties. Second, Pagani perhaps in a surfeit of moral concern 
and probably before Garcetti was handed down conceded in his 
amended complaint that reporting child abuse incidents was part of his 
professional duties.245 Last, the pertinent Connecticut reporting statute 
lists numerous individuals and entities, other than teachers, who are 
mandated to report child abuse.246 The statute makes reporting a duty 
236. /d. 
237. /d. 
238. Pagani v. Meriden Bd. ofEduc., No. 3:05-CV-01115, 2006 WL 3791405, at *1 (D. Conn. 
Dec. 19, 2006). 
239. /d. 
240. /d. at *2. 
241 . /d. The factual record in the opinion is unclear, but apparently Pagani was tenured or had 
otherwise secured some sort of contractual or statutory job protection that prohibited his being 
dismissed. /d. 
242. /d. at *4. 
243. /d. at *4. 
244. /d. at $2. 
245. /d. at *3. 
246. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101 (2007). This statute covers the following mandated reporters: 
Any physician or surgeon licensed under the provisions of chapter 370, any resident 
physician or intern in any hospital in this state, whether or not so licensed, any registered 
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but does not make reporting a job requirement. In Connecticut, the 
statute imposes punishment for failure to report fines and mandatory 
training but not job discipline.247 Although perhaps a too-fine point, 
state legislatures imposed this legal duty on numerous classes of 
citizens, including teachers, because of the information gleaned on the 
job, thereby making the statutory duty a condition of citizenship, not a 
condition of employment. This is particularly so when the penalty for 
failure to report in some states is punishable as a crime.248 Thus, 
because information is gleaned because of the teacher's position, speech 
about the information may be punishable as an official duty. 
The same lack of protection inured to New York City public school 
teachers w·ho reported that their supervisor inappropriately touched and 
sexually harassed students and other teachers.249 The supervisor was 
tertninated when the allegations were substantiated; the teachers who 
reported these problems along with numerous other matters alleged 
they were retaliated against by being harassed then forced to resign. 250 
In addressing their First Amendment claims, the court determined that 
the teachers' reports were not protected because school district policy 
mandated reporting. 251 As a consequence, the reports were undertaken 
as an official duty. 252 
nurse, licensed practical nurse, medica] examiner, dentist, denta] hygienist, psychologist, 
coach of intramural or interscholastic athletics, school teacher, school principal, school 
guidance counselor, school paraprofessional, school coach, social worker, police officer, 
juvenile or adult probation officer, juvenile or adult parole officer, member of the clergy, 
phar rnacist, physical therapist, optometrist, chiropractor, podiatrist, mental health 
professional or physician assistant, any person who is a licensed or certified emergency 
medical services provider, any person who is a licensed or certified alcohol and drug 
counselor, any person who is a licensed marital and family therapist, any person who is a 
sexual assault counselor or a battered women's counselor as defined in section 52-146k, 
any person who is a licensed professional counselor, any person paid to care for a child in 
any public or private facility, chi1d day care center, group day care home or family day 
care home licensed by the state, any employee of the Department of Children and 
Families, any employee of the Department of Public Health who is responsible for the 
licensing of child day care centers, group day care homes, family day care homes or 
youth camps, the Child Advocate and any employee of the Office of Child Advocate. 
!d. § 17a-101(b) (footnote omitted). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (2007) (obligating 
teachers, administrators, counselors, and day-care workers to report); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 28-711 (2007) 
(any "school employee" has an obligation to report). 
247. CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 17a-l0la (2007). But see FLA. STAT. § 1006.061 (2007) {child abuse 
reporting requirements must be posted in schools). 
248. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-33-22-1 (2007) (failure to report child abuse is Class B 
misdemeanor). 
249. Pearson v. Bd. ofEduc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 575, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
250. /d. at 584, 589. 
251. /d. at 589. 
252. /d. 
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Somewhat similar is Trujillo v. Board of Education where a high 
sc·hool aerospace instructor in an Air Force ROTC program, Trujillo, 
filed suit after being placed on administrative leave for alleged 
misconduct.253 In his First Amendment claim, Trujillo asserted that he 
had been punished for reporting his new superior's lack of certification 
from the . Federal Aviation Administration and alleged abuse of 
students.254 Garcetti was handed down in the midst of the suit and was 
latched onto by the supervisor as a defense to Trujillo's claim.255 
Although these two events could be split down the middle the first 
being job-related spee·ch and the other being official-duty speech the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly remanded the case for fact-
finding to make that determination.256 
Divining a court's decision when job~related speech is involved is not 
easy.; it is perhaps harder than deciding what a court will do with 
official-duty speech. As with its treatment of official-duty speech, the 
Garcetti decision created a vacuum for fact-finding inquiries in job-
related speech cases. Exacerbating the problem is that some courts are 
making decisions as questions of law rather than engaging in fact-
finding as set out in Garcetti. Furthermore, a significant time lag existed 
between the law and litigation strategy·. The unfortunate outcome may 
be that, as school boards become more willing to expand the official 
duties of their employees to encompass job-related speech, the more 
teachers and administrators will refrain from doing all the little extras 
that make the school boards accountable to the public. 
C. '(A Pall of Orthodoxy 1':257 Academic Speech 
One of the chief criticisms made by the dissenting Justices in Garcetti 
was the opinion's open threat to academic freedom.258 Indeed, the 
Court's majority, sounding defensive in the face of this and other 
withering attacks by the dissenting Justices, cordoned off its decision 
from academic freedom: 
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship 
253. 212 F. App'x 760, 763 (1Oth Cir. 2007). 
254. Jd. at 764. 
255. /d. 
256. /d. at 764· 65. 
257. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,_ 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967). 
258. "'I have to hope that today's majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment protection 
of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write 
'pursuant to official duties. 'u Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 438-39 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, J54 U.S. 234t 250 (1957)). 
1316 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that 
are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech 
jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether 
the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case 
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching. 259 
Apparently, some courts paid no attention to this declaration. 
The Fourth Circuit, no stranger to academic freedom disputes,260 used 
Garcetti as a new weapon against a teacher's discretion in classroom 
instruction. In Lee v. York County School Division, a school 
administrator removed controversial materials from a Spanish teacher's 
classroom bulletin board.261 The teacher wanted to post the materials, 
including a National Day of Prayer poster, a news article outlining 
religious differences between presidential candidates, a news article 
about the United States Attorney General's Bible study sessions, and 
news articles about the death of a missionary.262 The teacher believed 
that these postings would be useful to his students.263 The court 
determined that, because these materials were of a curricular nature a 
fact that Lee had conceded they were not matters of public concern as 
a matter of law0264 Reinforcing Lee's concession, the court also as a 
matter of law determined they were curricular because they were 
poste:d and therefore had the imprimatur of the high school and were 
designed to teach.265 Therefore, because the speech was curricular, it 
was employment-related and therefore not protected by the First 
Amendment.266 The Fourth Circuit thus reduced the controversy from a 
First Amendment matter to a mere employment dispute, an odd result 
considering the materials really had nothing to do with teachin-g Spanish 
259. ld. at 425 (majority opinion). 
260. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en bane). In 
Boring, the Fourth Circuit contlated the Pickering-Connick analysis freedom of' employee speech 
analysis with the freedom of student speech analysis in Hazelwood School District v. Kuh/meier, 484 
U.S. 260 (1988}. Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-69. In so doing, the court detennined that a teacher's 
selection of a controversial play about a dysfunctional, single-parent family was inappropriate on the 
basis of one parental complaint after the parent had signed a pennission stateme.nt to see the· play. Jd. at 
366. The principal had notice that the teacher was doing the play under the then-extant school district 
procedures, but he had undertaken no independent study of the play. /d. The court detennined this 
teacher's play selection was worthy of "discipline'; because it involved nothing more than an 
employment dispute. /d. at 368. Perhaps more accurately, the dispute was an effort. by the school 
principal and the county board of education to scapegoat the teacher to shield them from controversy. 
/d. at 374 (Hamilton, l; dissenting). 
261. 484 F .3d 687, 690 (4th Cir. 2007). 
262~ ld. 
263. /d. at 691-92. 
264. !d. at 696-97. 
265. /d. at 697-98. 
266. /d. at 700. 
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and the teacher's employment was never in jeopardy he had sued to be 
allowed to exercise his speech rights to post the materials.267 The 
reasons for entangling academic freedom even if by another name-
are just not apropos. 
Also oddly decided was Caruso v. Massapequa Union Free School 
District.268 Jillian Caruso was an elementary teacher for a year and a 
half for the school district _ until she resigned from her third-grade 
position in January, 2005.269 The event leading up to her resignation 
arose during the preceding fall's presidential campaign.270 As an active 
member of the Republican Party and an ardent supporter of President 
George W. Bush, she talked to 'her third-grade class about her 
activities.271 During that fall, Caruso posted an official White House 
photograph of Bush in her classroom.272 She claimed her principal273 
made her remove the Bush photograph and forced her to resign her 
position, an act of constructive discharge-.274 The school district's 
version of events detailed how the third-grade classes participated in a 
mock election during that fall and that Caruso had been given the option 
of either removing the Bush photograph or of adding a photograph of 
Senator John Keny, the other presidential candidate, for purposes of 
balance in that election.275 On the school district's motion for summary 
267. !d. at 691-92. An alternative decision might have been better premised on harassment or 
church·state arguments~ See, e.g.-, Piggee v. Carl Sandburg CoiL, 464 F .3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006). Martha 
Louise Pigge_e was a part-time c_osmetology instructor at Carl Sandburg College who regularly 
interjected her religious beliefs into her instruction and regularly gave out religious tracts to selected 
students. !d. at 672. After she gave a gay student two religious tracts attacking the sinfulness of 
homosexuality during instructional time, the college decided not to retain her for violating its anti-sexual 
harassment policy. !d. at 668. Piggee's First Amendment cJaim asserted, in part, that she should be able 
to discuss religious matters with students. !d. at 670. The Seventh Circuit detennined that Garcetti was 
inapplicable to this situation except to emphasize the public school employer's interest in ensuring that 
appropriate classroom instruction occur: the college was concerned that Piggee's religious activities 
impeded the instructional curriculum because so many students were uncomfortable with her 
proselytizing. !d. at _672. Having detennined that .Piggee's actions fel1 within the ambit of its anti· 
sexual harassment policy, the- college was well within its rights to restrain Piggee's actions and 
thereafter refuse to keep her on its faculty. /d. at 673-74. Throughout, the Seventh Circuit was cautious 
to tiptoe around the academic freedom issues. !d. at 670-71. The distinction between the Seventh 
Circuit's decision here and its_ later decision in Mayer v. Monroe County Community School Corp., 474 
F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 160 (2007), is the difference between the- higher 
education institution in Piggee and the K-12 public school corporation in Mayer. 
268. 478 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
269. !d. at 380. 
270. /d. 
271. !d. 
272. !d. 
273. Caruso alleged that the principal was married to a liberal elected official and kept a picture of 
Senator Hil1ary Clinton in her office. /d. 
274. !d. at 380-81. 
275. !d. at 38L The less glamorous problem was that Caruso was not a very good teacher. !d. 
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judgment against Caruso'·s First Amendment claim, the federal district 
court first considered the Garcetti analysis, addressing the problem as 
official-duty speech.276 The district court gave lip-service to Justice 
Kennedy's caution about classroom instruction and then confused 
Caruso's classroom activities as something other than classroom 
instruction, going off on a short jaunt about job descriptions and official 
duties.277 Then the court further confused the matter. It asserted that 
"whether an employee speaks pursuant to his official duties and whether 
such speech falls into the category of protected speech present questions 
of law for the court," but it ruled that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because there remained numerous questions of fact, 
especially concerning the nature of Caruso's duties pursuant to 
Garcetti.218 As best can be wrested from this analysis, classroom speech 
may or may not be protected, but if it is part of a teacher's official 
duties, then it is not protected. 
The Seventh Circuit was less ambiguous in Mayer v. Monroe County 
Community School Corp., when it relied on Garcetti to uphold the 
dismissal of a probationary elementary teacher for her in-class 
instruction based on materials approved by the school district.279 In 
doing so, the court left no doubt that kindergarten through twelfth-grade 
teachers within its jurisdiction have no academic freedom. Deborah 
Mayer, while teaching current events, was asked by one of her students 
whether she had participated in any political demonstrations.280 The 
discussion surrounded instructional materials approved by the school 
district.281 According to the court, she replied that "when she passed a 
demonstration against this nation's military operations in Iraq and saw a 
placard saying 'Honk for Peace', [sic] she honked her car's horn to show 
support for the demonstrators."282 After "some parents'' complained, 
Mayer's teaching contract was not renewed for a second year.283 
276. Jd. at 382-83. 
277. /d. 
278. !d. at 384. The court also suggested that if the Garcetti-employment analysis did not apply, 
then it would follow the Connick-Pickering analysis of citizen's speech on matters of public concern. 
/d. at 383. 
279. 474 F.3d477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 160 (2007). 
280: !d. at 478. 
281. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. I :04-CV-1695, 2006 WL 693555, at *2 
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2006), ajJ'd, 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007). 
282. Mayer, 474 F.3d at 478. 
283. !d. The Seventh Circuit opinion is somewhat at odds with the undisputed facts elicited 
during the school district's motion for summary judgment and recounted by the district court. See 
Mayer, 2006 WL 693555, at *2-9. According to those facts, Mayer taught in an alternative learning 
class for children in fourth through sixth grades, in Bloomington, Indiana, hom~ of Indiana University. 
/d. at *2. Every Friday, Mayer used a children's newsletter, Time for Kids, to discuss current events. /d. 
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Relying on Garcetti as the main impetus for its decision, the court 
discounted notions of academic freedom and ruled that Mayer's 
discussion of current events was within her official duties.284 Because 
the school district had "hired" Mayer for her speech, the school district 
could restrict its teachers as the basis of its curriculum to teaching 
speech but not opinion speech.285 However, Mayer engaged in only 
teaching speech, and she did not depart from the school-approved 
curriculum.286 But just to be on the safe side, the court essentially 
quashed any notion that public school teachers have any academic 
freedom except within the context of the curriculum and therefore within 
the majority's rule because teachers' only employment is to be 
Time for Kids was approved for use at her elementary school in general and in her classroom in 
particular. 1d. The December 13, 2002 issue of Time for Kids featured peace marches in Washington, 
D.C. to protest U.S. involvement in launching a war on Iraq. /d. One of Mayer's students asked if she 
would participate in a peace march: 
At that time I said, "Peace marches are going on all over the country. We even have 
demonstrations here in Bloomington, Indiana. When I drive past the courthouse square 
and the demonstrators are picketing I honk my hom for peace because their signs say, 
'Honk for Peace.'["] 
And then I went on to say that I thought that it was important for people to seek out 
peaceful solutions to problems before going to war and that we train kids to be mediators 
on the playground so that they can seek out peaceful solutions to their own problems and 
so they won't fight and hurt each other. And that was the extent of the conversation and 
the discussion. 
/d. Her complaint further alleged that "[s]he stated that she thought peace was an option to war and that 
peaceful solutions should be sought before going to war." /d. After only one set of parents 
complained several sets of parents complained about Mayer's teaching methods but only one set of 
parents complained about the First Amendment issue the school principal issued a directive that, 
although the school would continue to promote peace in the classroom, teachers were not to promote 
any particular foreign policy view. /d. at *3. He also cancelled the school's annual Peace Month. /d. 
The Time for Kids article for December 13, 2002, Searching Iraq, included the following: 
Opinion polls show that 58% of Americans would support such an attack. Still, many are 
speaking out against it. A big antiwar rally is scheduled in Washington, D.C., this week. 
"There are other ways to deal with [Hussein] besides bombing," says peace activist Elke 
Heitmeyer. "Wars will only create more violence." 
Ritu Upadhyay, Searching Iraq, TIME FOR KIDS, Dec. 13, 2002 (alteration in original) (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.timeforkids.comffFK/teachers/wr/article/0,27972,397638, OO.html. 
284. Mayer, 414 F.3d at 479. 
285. /d. 
286. See id. The court's hyperbolic attempt at analogy does not make its conclusion any more 
convincing. In erecting the straw-man bad teacher who would prevail if Mayer's innocuous statement 
were unpunished, the court asserted that school districts would have no authority to control teachers like 
a social studies teacher who teaches inaccurate statements that Benedict Arnold was not a traitor; a 
teacher who teaches religious theory rather than the text in violation of the separation of church and 
state; an English teacher who is hired to teach only Moby Dick but teaches Cry; the Beloved Country 
instead; and a math teacher who prefers to teach calculus over trigonometry. /d. The first teacher is 
incompetent while the other three are insubordinate; these straw-men do not raise curricular concerns to 
support the court's holding. 
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govennnent speakers:287 "[T]he first amendment does not entitle primary 
and secondary teachers, when conducting the education of captive 
audiences, to cover topics, or advocate viewpoints, that depart from the 
curriculum adopted by the school system."288 
Perhaps one saving grace of these decisions is that they seem limited 
to politically controversial matters rather than true controversy over 
curriculum. That is not to say that school boards will not use these cases 
as precedent to punish teachers for classroom speech. The reality is that 
these cases arise although not ':llways when a school administrator is 
put into the hot seat by a couple of "offended" parents. The record 
reflects no general public outcry about the substance of what these 
teachers said or did in their classrooms, and a few parent complaints 
necessitate only a discussion about the appropriateness of presenting 
both points of view on religious and political materials. Rather than find 
themselves in a bind, however, the school administrators took action 
against the teacher to forestall the school boards' going after them 
instead, especially if the teacher was in a more vulnerable employment 
position than the administrators. However characterized, these cases are 
about politics and not at all about the curriculum. Therefore, they were 
not really official-duty cases. Perhaps they can be cabined as outliers 
and not as academic freedom cases.289 
The speech involved in the above cases clearly runs the gamut of 
activities in which teachers may be engaged as part of their jobs: official 
speech, speech based on information derived only from being on the job, 
and classroom speech. Setting aside for the moment classroom speech 
that would otherwise be protected under academic freedom, the dividing 
line between the other two types of speech is blurry. No trend is clear 
except that courts seem prone to allow school boards to punish 
teachers and administrators for anything said at work as necessarily 
arising from the fact of the employment and thereby becoming official-
duty speech. This unfortunate tendency will lead to an ever-widening 
artificial range of official duties to justify these actions as "legitimate" 
punitive action rather than First Amendment retaliation. 
On the other hand, perhaps the trend of courts' allowing school 
boards to punish faculty for things said at work hides the real dilemma 
with which courts are wrestling. when are employees on the job not 
citizens and therefore punishable for official-duty speech? How does a 
court extrapolate a line between the employee and the citizen on the job? 
287. ld. at 479-80. 
288. /d. at 480. 
289. However, one should not be hopeful because the Mayer opinion suggests that the Seventh 
Circuit is anxious to attack academic freedom at institutions of higher education also. /d. at 480. 
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That diletmna is perhaps more acute for teachers than for others, as 
evidenced by the mixed results of recent cases, because their stock in 
trade is speech; their entire work world requires speech. Perhaps that is 
the point: either sc-hool boards can always retaliate against teachers 
because they always speak only as employees, or perhaps the Garcetti 
analysis is an inappropriate fit and should not be applied to teachers at 
. . 
all. 
Ill. "BY THE WORK ONE KNows THE WORKMAN"290 
A. Teachers' Official Duties 
An easy answer to the Garcetti inquiry into teachers' official duties 
would be for schools to have written job descriptions. Other than the 
terms of a particular individual's contract start and end date, job 
assignment, supplemental assignments like coaching, and salary a 
school board would then find it difficult to enumerate official duties it 
had assigned to any particular teacher. However, experienced teachers 
would be hard-pressed to produce job descriptions of the positions for 
which they were hired. Administrators may have an easier time of 
articulating the-specific written responsibilities for which they have been 
hired and that they must fulfill to do their jobs competently.291 But 
teachers have a hard time articulating what their official duties entail 
other than being teachers from the time they enter the door until the time 
they leave. 
The question then remains, in an environment without specific, 
written job descriptions, how the parties to a Garcetti proceeding will 
define the undefined. Of course, school board witnesses' testimony 
likely will broaden a teacher's tasks to cover nearly all on-the-job 
290. This quotation has been attributed to Jean de La Fontaine. See JOHN BARTLEIT, FAMILIAR 
QUOi A TIONS 983 (lOth ed. 1919). 
291. For example, Chicago Public Schools enumerates numerous requirements for its school 
principals, among them; the competencies to: 
Assess the Quality of Classroom Instruction 
[I] Know and have the ability to direct the implementation of successful literacy and 
mathematic strategies school-wide 
[2] Possess expert knowledge of a range of effective learning theories and practices, with 
the ability to model practice, and coach and assist teachers to support instructional 
improvement 
[3] Have_ an understanding of and ability to lead standards-based instruction 
[4] Be able to use data to improve instruction and student ac-hievement 
Chicago Public Schools Principal Competencies, http://www.oppdcps.com/downloads/ 
Competencies.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2008). 
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speech, in the absence of ,any limiting direction, and especially 
sufficiently broadly to justify the school board's actions. Teachers, then, 
will have an incentive to testify that their official duties are narrow. 
Courts inquiring into teachers' official duties should consider norms 
that state legislatures have used to limit school board power to fire at 
will. In other words, in the absence of an affirmative job description, 
teachers' official duties should be circumscribed by negative norms for 
which teachers may be discharged or disciplined.292 Even more 
protective would be those norms spelled out in a collective bargaining 
agreement between the school board and its teachers because those 
nortns are more protective than those minimal protections afforded by 
the state. Those statutory and contractual parameters would have the 
virtue of not being as subjective and self-serving as a school board's 
testimony to support its grounds for retaliating. 
These negative norms are inexact, but the legislative language and the 
interpretive case precedent make them more exact. The fairly universal 
norms for which teachers can be disciplined are as follows: 
incompetence, neglect of duty, insubordination, immorality,293 unfitness 
to teach, and unprofessional condu.ct.294 Incompetence is the inability to 
do the job in the technical (not instructional) sense, such as being unable 
to conduct classes, unable to conununicate effectively, unable to 
supervise the class, or deficient in the su~ject matter.295 Incompetence is 
. . 
a comparative norm, viewing a particular teacher's performance in the 
classroom, in her professional relationships, and in her personal 
problems against the standard of other teachers' performance and 
professionalism.296 Neglect of duty, on the other hand, is the failure to 
perfonn and is usually some type of dereliction of duty. Such neglect to 
carry out the duties of the job includes failure to tum in grades, 
tardiness, use of alcohol on the premises, and failure to supervise 
292. See, e.g., CAL. Eouc. COOE § 89535 (West 2007); COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-63-301 (2007); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 20..:2-940 (2007); MINN. STAT. § l22A.40 subdiv. 9 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 342.865 (2007). 
293. See~ e.g., JOSEPH BECKHAM, MEETING LEGAL CHALLENGES 70-77 (1996); NELDA H. 
CAMBRON-MCCABE, MARTHA M. MCCARTHY & STEPHEN B. THOMAS, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: 
TEACHERS' AND STUDENTS' RIGHTS 412--20 (5th ed. 2004); RICHARD D. STRAHAN & L. CHARLES 
TURNER, THE COURTS AND THE SCROOLS: THE ·SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR AND LEGAL RISK 
MANAGEMENT TODAY 152-55 (1987). 
294. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra note 293, at 420--22. "(O)ther good and 
just cause" might pick up the more isolated and less easy-to-categorize event such as criminal 
conviction, id. at 422:-23, lack of certification, improper discipline, repeated profanity in the classroom, 
and lying to a supervisor, see BECKHAM, supra note 293, at 77. 
295. DAVID CARR, PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS IN TEACHING 151 (2000); STRAHAN & 
TURNER, supra note 293, at 1 54. 
296. STRAHAN & TURNER, supra note 293, at 154. 
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students. 297 Insubordination is a willful act; it is a refusal to obey 
supervisor directives or school regulations. A single act is rarely 
insubordination. Rather, cause for discharge requires a pattern of 
refusing to comply with reasonable directives.298 Immorality as grounds 
for teacher discharge is a rather broad term inasmuch as teachers are 
viewed as student role models. Hence, the threshold for determining 
when a teacher acts immorally is fairly low, although acts of moral 
turpitude, criminal convictions, and sexual misconduct with students are 
the typical grounds for immorality discipline.299 Unfitness to teach is 
probably more a subset of "incompetence" than an independent nornt; it 
covers such things as "conduct detrimental to the operation of the 
school,'' ''[ e ]vi dent unfitness for service," and mental, emotional or 
physical incapacity.300 Unprofessional conduct may encompass the 
behavior disciplined under other norms, such as neglect of duty or 
unfitness to teach.301 Although school boards are wont to use this 
ground for terrnination broadly, its meaning really relies on some 
understanding of how teachers should comport themselves as 
professionals, perhaps according to some set of professional ethics. 302 
297. BECKHAM, supra note 293, at 75-76; CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra 
note 293, at418-19; STRAHAN & TURNER, supra note 293, at 155. 
298. BECKHAM, supra note 293, at 73-75; CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra 
note 293, at 416-18; STRAHAN & TURNER, supra note 293, at 154. 
299. BECKHAM, supra note 293, at 70-73; CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra 
note 293, at 413-16; STRAHAN & TURNER, supra note 293, at 153- 54. 
300. CAMBRON-MCCABE, MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra note 293, at 421-22 {quoting Lombardo 
v. Bd. of Educ. , 241 N.E.2d 495, 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Comm'n on Profl Competence, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 227 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
301. /d. at 420-21 . 
302. E.g., LOUIS FISCHER, DAVID SCHIMMEL & LESLIE R. STELLMAN, TEACHERS AND THE LAW 
39 (6th ed. 2003). Some states even have a code of professional ethics for teachers. E.g., MINN. R. 
§ 8700.7500 (2007); STATE PROF'L STANDARDS AND PRACTICES BD. FOR TEACHING, N.Y. STATE 
EDUC. DEP'T, NEW YORK STATE CODE OF ETHICS FOR EDUCATORS (2002), available at 
http://www.highered.nysed.gov/tcert/pdf/codeofethics.pdf (stating that a code of professional ethics 
cannot be used as the basis for discipline). Most do not so teachers often rely on their own notion of 
professionalism from either an innate sense of ethics or something more tangible, like the Code of Ethics 
of the Education Profession espoused by the National Education Association. See NAT'L Eouc. Ass'N, 
CODE OF ETHICS OF THE EDUCATION PROFESSION (1975), available at http://www.nea.org/ 
aboutnea/code.html. 
This last ground for statutory and contractual discharge is unprofessional conduct and in 
itself illustrates the strange dynamic that Garcetti has imposed on the teaching profession. That code of 
professionalism whatever its tenns often impels teachers to speak out about the nature of the job 
itself, especially matters of mismanagement or misconduct. This is surely what impelled some of the 
teachers in the Garcetti cases to insist that they had official obligations to speak because they sincerely 
believed their self-imposed sense of professional ethics demanded it. Indeed, they were proud to admit 
that they were so attentive to their professional responsibilities. With the continuing onslaught of 
Garcetti cases, however, teachers are going to begin retracting their notions of professionalism in their 
own self-interests. 
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A teacher's official duties therefore can be limited to behaviors for 
which the states have ascribed sufficient importance that, when 
perfonned badly, may result in discipline. Thus, a teacher's affirmative 
and official duties include the following: (I) be technically competent, 
which includes the physical, mental and psychological presence to 
conduct and supervise a class, to communicate effectively, and to be 
proficient in the subject area; (2) conform to the technical work-day 
requirements, like attendance, physical appearance, timeliness, 
recordkeeping, and fulfilling supervisory duties; (3) follow school 
district regulations and supervisors' directives, including handbooks and 
school board policies; (4) abide by and fulfill all responsibilities and 
duties imposed by all state and federal laws common law, statutory 
and regulatory applying to that position or that activity; (5) comport 
oneself in one's private life so as not to reflect poorly on the school 
district, particularly avoiding bringing one's private problems into the 
workplace; (6) treat colleagues and non-certified staff in a professional 
manner. Any speech in these areas would be official-duty speech.303 
Cut and dried as they are, these guidelines reflect teachers' 
affirtnative official duties for which a school board may hold them 
accountable as reflective of the considered wisdom of state legislatures. 
Hence, these should be the official duties for which a school board may 
retaliate even when a te-acher speaks about them properly. Of course, 
retaliation will not accomplish the discharge of the statutorily or 
contractually protected teachers. But probatio.nary teachers and 
administrators without such protections .can be discharged under 
Garcetti within this framework. A school board attempting to go 
beyond this framework exceeds its license under Garcetti and treads on 
teachers' speech rights as citizens. Thus, assuming that Garcetti should 
even be imposed on teachers, its power should be limited by narrow job 
descriptions. 
30J. A case of hair-splitting that did not involve any real "official duties, ofteachers is Brammer-
Hoefler v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy, 492 F.3d 1192 (I Oth Cir. 2007); see also Dillon v. Twin Peaks 
Charter Acad., 241 F. App~x 490 (1Oth Cir. 2007). In Brammer-Boelter, the principal of a charter 
school retaliated against several teachers who met off-site to discuss c,oncems about the operation and 
management of the school. Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1198-1201. According to the court, 
unprotected official-duty speech included discussions about student discipline, curriculum, pedagogy, 
and equipment. /d. at 1204. Unofficial duty speech included teacher resignations, the Academy's 
teacher communication policy, staffing, salaries and bonuses, school board criticism, the principal's 
leadership failures, parent complaints, the renewal of the Academy's charter, and the pending school 
board elections. /d. at 1204-05. However, of these, the only matters of -public concern were the 
Academy's communication policy, the principal's prior restraint of teacher speech, the charter renewal 
and the school board elections. /d. at 1206. This parsing of "official duties" and "matters of public 
concern" makes little sense; especially in light of the fact that many of these off-site meetings included 
participation by parents and other members. of the public. /d. at 1199. 
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B. The Supreme Art of the Teacher:304 Academic Freedom 
Garcetti is also the wrong vehicle for retaliating against a teacher for 
classroom speech.305 Classically considered a matter of a teacher's 
prerogative_, efforts have been made to clothe the classroom speech of 
public school teachers clearly an official duty with a First 
Amendment academic freedom. 306 As the Court has stated, 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic 
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely 
to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special 
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that 
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. ''The vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in 
the community of American schools." The classroom is peculiarly 
the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends up.on 
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of 
ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] 
than through any kind of authoritative selection.,;307 
Some learned analyses suggest that the instructional portion of a 
teacher's job has separate considerations under the First Amendment as 
academic freedom, apart from the employment speech line of cases 
represented by Pickering, Connick, and now Garcetti.J-08 
However, the courts that have applied Garcettt to uphold retaliation 
decisions in classroom speech engage in an analysis reminiscent of 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.309 Hazelwood offered a 
principle of limited tolerance for student-initiated speech in the context 
304. "lt is the supreme art of the teacher to awaken joy in creative expression and knowledge.'' 
' ' 
This quotation bas been attributed to Albert Einstein. See THE COLUMBIA WORLD OF QUOTATIONS 
(Robert Andrew et al. eds., 1996), available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/85/18585.html. 
305. Note also that the statutory grounds for disciplining teac.hers and the cases arising therefrom 
rarely, if ever, mention classroom speech as a grounds for discipline. See, e.g., CAMBRON-MCCABE, 
MCCARTHY & THOMAS, supra note 293, at 412~23. 
306. See, e.g., Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers' Classroom Speech and the First 
Amendment, 30 J.L. & Eouc. 1, 39-51 (200 I); see also J. Peter Byme, Academic Freedom: A "Special 
Concern ofthe First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989) (academic freedom in higher education); R. 
George Wright, The Emergence of First Amendment Academic Freedom, 85 NEB. L. REv. 793 (2007) 
(academic freedom in higher education). See generally Diane. Heckman, Commentary, The First 
Amendment and Academia: Twenty Years of Examining Matters of Public Concern, 188 Eouc. L. REP. 
585, 586-89 (2004); W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution ofa Fish Out of 
Water; 77 NEB. L. REV. 301 (1998). 
307. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker; 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); United Slates v. Associated Press, 52 F. 
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). 
308. See; e.g., Daly, supra note 306, at 7-11; Wright, supra note 306, at 797-98. 
309. 484 u.s. 260 (1988). 
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of a student newspaper. The school could regulate that speech because 
it was school-sponsored and could "fairly be characterized as part of the 
school curriculum."310 At least one court now applies that same 
reasoning to teacher's classroom speech: A school district hires a teacher 
to convey school-sponsored speech, and as a consequence, the school 
district is not required to pay for a commodity it did not hire if the 
teacher strays from the "party" line. 311 
This type of analysis is a poor substitute for protection of teachers' 
academic freedom because it is inexact and it fits the listeners the 
teacher's audience not the speaker.312 In addition, Hazelwood at least 
recognizes some speech is acceptable and worthy of protection whereas 
Garcetti makes the content irrelevant: all that is critical to the analysis is 
the employee-employer relationship. Consequently, there now appears 
to be a small and unfortunate trend to quash all independent teaching 
• 
speech the real skill for which teachers are hired for uniformity in 
orthodoxy, contrary to that asserted by the Court in Epperson v. 
Arkansas: 
The States are most assuredly free "to choose their own 
curriculums for their own schools." A State is entirely free, for 
example, to decide that the only foreign language to be taught in its 
public school system shall be Spanish. But would a State be 
constitutionally free to punish a teacher for letting his students 
know that other languages are also spoken in the world? I think 
not. 
It is one thing for a State to detertnine that "the subject of 
higher mathematics, or astronomy, or biology" shall or shall not be 
included in its public school curriculum. It is quite another thing 
for a State to make it a[n] ... offense for a public school teacher so 
much as to mention the very existence of an entire system of 
respected human thought. That kind of . . . law, I think, would 
clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free conununication 
310. /d. at 271. The Supreme Court stated: 
They cannot be punished merely for expressing their personal views on the school 
premises whether "in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the 
authorized hours" unless school authorities have reason to believe that such expression 
will "substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of 
other students." 
/d. at 266 (citation omitted) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 
512-13 (1969)). 
311. Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
128 S. Ct. 160 (2007). 
312. See Daly, supra note 306, at 14. 
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contained in the First Amendment .... 313 
Surely, Garcetti was not designed to make teachers puppets of school 
boards and their whims. When all the discretion is taken out of the 
teaching obligation, what is there left to do? 
This Article is not designed to forge new ground in the matter of 
academic freedom; it is instead designed to address Garcetti's impact on 
teachers. As noted in the analysis, many cases applying Garcetti to 
school district retaliation against teachers really do not involve 
curricular disputes~ Rather, they were instances of school administrators 
who punished teachers when parents got upset over perceived political 
statements and who lashed out before the parents went to the s-chool 
board, who would then punish the school administrators as a form of 
defensive retaliation. They were academic freedom issues, but unrelated 
to curriculum.314 
To the extent that courts continue to frame academic freedom cases as 
curricular issues, there is probably little to fear that teachers' academic 
freedom will be threatened often by Garcetti. B_ecause the reality is that 
school boards really have-no hand in curriculum, are rarely qualified to 
control curriculum, and, as discussed below, probably do not want that 
obligation. 
Of all the members of the educational hierarchy, school boards are the 
entity least able to contribute substantively to curriculum formation. 
The members are electe.d officials who usually run on one-issue 
platforms or who are more interested in the fiscal management of the 
governmental entity. As a consequence, they usually have no training, 
background, or experienc-e in education and education policy. Although 
their advocacy groups may have some expertise in the area, school board 
members do not serve life~time tenures, and the members filter in and 
out of the political process. Continuity in the teaching process is 
necessary, and school boards_ do not and cannot fulfill that role. 
Instead, for curriculum purposes, school boards are governed by what 
their state education departments set out, for any particular grade or for 
any particular discipline, as the curricular goals.315 The implementation 
of those goals is outside the expertise of the school boards so they 
delegate academic matters like curriculum to those better equipped to 
313. 393 U.S. 97, 115-16 (1968) (Stewart; J., concuning in the result). 
314. Such fear of retaliation is the natural consequence of "elected school boards [that] are 
tempted to support majority positions about religious or patriotic subjects." Mayer, 414 F.3d at 479. 
315. Seet e.g., MICHAEL IMBER& TYLL VAN GEEL, EDUCATION LAW 62·67 (3d ed. 2004). These 
days, the federal government, through the No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2000 & 
Supp. V 2005), is playing a greater role in the states' prerogative to control their curricular choices and 
academic programs. 
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handle them. And the individuals who are better equipped to formulate 
curricular affairs and the educational function of the institution .are the 
education professionals: teachers and school administrators. It is to 
them that school boards delegate the responsibility for curriculum and 
all things associated with curriculum, such as textbook selection, 
curriculum guides, and often grading policies. If the school district is 
large enough, it may have curriculum professionals on administrative 
staff to assure compliance with state models and to oversee the general 
academic agenda. In other districts, teachers and administrators (and 
perhaps parents) serve on committees to formulate academic policy and 
adopt textbooks. In some jurisdictions, curricular programming and 
academic programming are, at the very least, mandatory subjects of 
labor discussion with the teachers, if not mandatory subjects of 
bargaining. Thus, only the rare state gives the school board full power 
over the academic program. As a consequence of this delegation of 
academic programming and derogation of control, only the unique 
school board can prove it has such control over the curriculum that its 
teachers and administrators have no academic freedom. As a practical 
matter, the vast ·majority of school boards afford academic freedom to 
their teachers and administrators over curricular and academic 
programming as both a legal and as a practical matter, regardless of 
what the courts decide. And it would be the rare school board that 
would wish to do it all itself.316 
Confining teachers' classroom speech to only specified curricular 
matters, without the ability to step outside the lines, defeats the purpose 
of a democratic education that puts little value on uniformity and 
orthodoxy. Indeed, students are unimpressed by teachers confined by 
strictures imposed on academic planning and curricular materials: 
316. School boards are also ill-equipped to deal with curricular issues because they are a 
majoritarian representative body: 
[W]ithin our .constitutional scheme, the representative nature of school boards may 
actually militate against allowing them unrestricted control over curricular dec.isions. 
Elected officials likely are highly responsive to the majority that voted for them. Since 
the majority controls the election, we need not otherwise protect dominant viewpoints of 
established groups. Similarly~ electoral accountability ensures that those ·who disagree 
with these dominant views rarely hold pubJic office. This political process, however, 
scantily protects the community's ideological minorities. These disadvantaged outsiders, 
lacking political influence, most need the first amendment to protect them from the 
tyranny and transient passions ofthe majority. 
Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the ltPa/1 of Orthodoxy": Value Training in the Public 
Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 15, 38. For a contrary vie_w: "[I]f indoctrination is likely, the. power 
should be reposed in someone the people can vote out of office, rather than tenured teachers." Mayer, 
474 F.3d at 479-80. 
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Students always test their teachers, and teachers too seldom pass those 
tests. What they are looking for in their teachers are a few basic 
qualities honesty, integrity, concern. They generally dislike teachers 
who merely parrot what their own superiors, or their own lesson plans, 
tell them to say. They respond to the local, not to the imperial. They 
respond to the individual, not to the institution. They respond to the act 
of one man or woman stepping away from the protection of the school 
system and the textbook, from the collusion of adults and authorities, and 
taking risks based on faith in individual students. That act of faith, the 
faith of one teacher in one student, is the center of it all. 317 
As a consequence, academic freedom is willingly ceded to public school 
teachers by their school boards, a cession with which courts should be 
loathe to interfere, despite Garcetti. 
IV. BE CAREFUL WHArYouWISHFOR 
A.. Employee Morale 
Now that public employers can punish or even dismiss public 
employees for communicating to and about their students in essence, 
for doing their jobs Garcetti will likely accomplish that which public 
employers feared would happen if public employees were allowed to 
speak out under the First Amendment: it will likely "lower morale, 
disrupt the work force, or otherwise undermine the mission of the 
office."318 The immediate effect of Garcetti and the increasing number 
of teacher retaliation cases being decided in its wake will likely render 
the labor-management relations in the workplace even m.ore contentious. 
With the definition of "official duties" unclear at best, and an 
unattainable moving target at worst, teachers and administrators will not 
know how to protect themselves from the "fanciful" fears of their 
employer. 
And the tension is not just reserved for school boards and their 
employees. It also encourages a widening rift between administrators 
and teachers. It will further "the parking lot syndrome," where the 
administration talks at faculty meetings while the faculty talks in the 
parking lot afterward.319 Improvements in and critiques of academic and 
3-17. PETER S. TEMES, AGAINST SCHOOL REFORM (AND IN PRAISE OF GREAT TEACHING): 
GETIING BEYOND ENDLESS TESTING! REGIMENTATION, AND REFORM IN OUR SCHOOLS 160 (2002). 
318. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 393 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (remarking that 
public employers' fears were "fanciful'1}. 
319. ROLAND S. BARTH, IMPROVING SCHOOLS FROM WITHIN: TEACHERS, PARENTS AND 
PRINCIPALS CAN MAKE THE DIFFERENCE 20 (1990). 
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other schoolhouse matters will be suspended for fear that the teachers' 
speech will not comport with an administrators' orthodoxy.320 And 
teachers' classroom instruction will be stunted by the fear that they will 
be disciplined even discharged based on their speech, which only 
could be protected by some irrational and unknowable standard. 
Independent thought will be abandoned for concern of potential job loss. 
Teachers and administrators will become even greater adversaries than 
before.321 Gone are the days when 
[a]ll the habits of mind and work that go into democratic 
institutional life [are] practiced in our schools until they truly 
become habits so deeply a part of us that in times of stress we fall 
back on them rather than abandon them in search of a great leader 
or father figure, or retreat into the private isolation of our private 
interests, the unfettered marketplace where one need not worry 
about the repercussions of one's individual decisions.322 
In their place are the days of fear and anxiety: Teachers and school 
administrators have specific job skills, and there is rarely more than one 
educational employer in town. Therefore, losing a teaching or 
administrative job often means leaving the community.323 
The only saving grace for teachers but usually not for 
administrators may be an increased union pres_ence to assure that 
retaliatory acts are ineffective under the state tenure and collective 
320. Unfortunately, the situation may s_imply reflect the status quo as some administrative 
orthodoxy does not have much respect for teachers anyway: 
[T]eaching is largely a, feminized occupation. It therefore behaves that way in some 
situations. 
Teachers are highly sensitive about status differentials. They are highly resistant to 
change~ They are suspicious of authority. They are politically conservative. They are 
not an easy group to lead, govern, congeal, motivate, or cajole. They are, however, easily 
insulted, provoked, intimidated, or angered. Great teachers are always prima donnas with 
their principals and sometimes with their students. 
It should be remembered that administrators deal with tea~hers as adults. However, 
teachers are most used to dealing with students. They often have a terrible time dealing 
with other adults and especially with persons in authority. Some teachers are just awful 
adults. 
JOHN A. BLACK & FENWICK W. ENGLISH, WHAT THEY DON'T TELL YOU IN SCHOOLS OF EDUCATION 
ABOUT SCHOOL ADMINISTRA TJON 75 (1986) (footnote omitted). UnfortunateJy, administrators have 
their own personal baggage. See, e.g., Donal M. Sacken, Sad Stories of the Death of Kings: Demotions 
and Dismissals of Administrators, 25 J .L. & Eouc. 419 ( 1996). 
321. See BARTH, supra note 319, at 19-22. 
322. DEBORAH MEIER, IN SCHOOLS WE TRUST: CREATING COMMUNITIES OF LEARNING IN AN 
ERA OF TESTING AND STANDARDIZATION 177 (2002). 
323. In addition, losing a teaching job may well preclude teaching ever after because of the stigma 
attached. See generally Jay Worona & Cheryl Randall, Defamation and Stigma Claims by Terminated 
Employees, in TERMINATION OF SCHOOL EMPLOYEES: LEGAL ISSUES & TECHNIQUES 13-1 ( 1997). 
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bargaining acts and under the pertinent coJlective bargaining agreements 
that govern the discipline and discharge of teachers.324 So far, the vast 
majority of teacher cases involved teachers with little experience, 
usually the least protected and most vulnerable under the statutes. 
Indeed, in these and administrator cases, the First Amendment may well 
have been invoked because of the absence of other statutory or 
contractual protections. However, the new "orthodoxy" of school 
boards325 for the "efficiency of the educational system"326 may impel 
school boards to flex their new-found power over mote experienced 
teachers. Even if they do not, the "pall" may poison the employment 
relationship at the least, and at the worst, interfere with the ''efficiency 
of the educational system." 
B. Schools as a Matter of Public Concern 
The perspective on this new power given by the Court to school 
boards may evoke different public reactions. One reaction at the 
forefront likely will be this power's potential to squelch public oversight 
of the educational institution. If the foxes are guarding the henhouse 
and the hens cannot give warning of legitimate problems, then the public 
trust in the institution will justifiably be eroded even further. On such 
issues, those with eroded trust would run a school board election 
campaign opposing sitting members. Their election issues would b·e 
twofold: the school board is not responsive to the taxpayers, and the 
school board is hiding something.327 
This reaction would rest on this premise: Much of what educators do 
in public schools is a matter of public concern. Educators know better 
than the school board members what is going on in the schools day to 
324. fiSCHER, SCHIMMEL & STELLMAN, supra note 302, at 41. 
325. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National School Hoards Association in Support of Petitioners, 
Garcetti v. Ceballos; 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473), 2005 WL 1284578. See generally Thomas E. 
Wheeler, II, Striking a Faustian Bargain: The Boundaries of Public Employee Free Speech Rights, REs 
GESTAE, Sept. 2006, at 1 3. Mr. Wheeler was one of counsel on the NSBA amicus brief in support of the 
public employer. 
326. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Schoo1 Boards Association in Support of Petitioners, supra 
note 325, at 1. 
327. Although one would hope school board elections would take the high road and not engage in 
bashing the incumbents, the unfortunate fact is that candidates must distinguish themselves from the 
incumbents. Showing that the current board members do not feel they can be held accountable to the 
public will resonate with voters. See, e.g., Associated Press, Dover Voters Oust Intelligent Design 
Supporters, MSNBC~COM, Nov. 9, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9973228; MSNBC 
Staff and N.ews Service Reports, Evolution's Foes Lose Ground in Kansas, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 2, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc~msn.com/id/14137751; Jessica Blanchard, Groups Prepare for School Board 
Election, SEA TILE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 18, 2007, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/ 
locall316380_appleseed 19 .html. 
' 
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day. In addition, educators are often the sole sources for infonnation 
that might not otherwise be a matter of public knowledge. But for their 
jobs, they would not have this information. The best resources for 
speech about government accountability on the day-to-day operations of 
school districts, therefore, are those now at risk of being discharged 
under Garcetti. 
The impetus for this perspective is that teachers are a special type of 
citizen. In other words, a teacher's chosen profession is at all times a 
matter of public concern, and when teachers are at their places of 
employment, they remain citizens. The unique nature of this public 
employment makes teachers' personas inseparable from their citizen 
personas,. This may be for no other reason than their self-imposed sense 
of personal ethics. It may also be the practical continuity that must carry 
them through any number of school board members who are not 
education professionals. But it also arises because of the nature of the 
institution, its structure, and its role in society. 
Numerous philosophers have enunciated their constructs of education 
and how teaching can implement it.328 For instance, Plato's notion of 
education posited that the 
teacher's task is to effect a kind-of intellectual conversion experience in 
the learner that redirects the person from the sensory world of 
appearanc_es, images, and opinions to the realm of ideas. Whereas 
knowing can occur only in the mind of the person, the teacher creates the 
proper environment and asks the questions that will stimulate the learning 
process. 329 
In a more contemporary vein, John Dewey stated that the ''value of 
school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued 
growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact.''330 
He further opined, 
Without . . . formal education, it is not possible to transmit all the 
resources and achievements of a complex society. It also opens a way to 
a kind of experience which would not be accessible to the young, if they 
were left to pick up their training in informal association with others, 
since books and the symbols ofknowledge are mastered.331 
In addition, upon that institution are placed the burdens of universal 
328. See generally GERALD L. 0UTEK, HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
EDUCATION: A BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 1997). 
329. /d. at 22. 
330. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCMCY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
EDUCATION 53 (1st Free Press Paperback ed., The Free Pre-ss 1966) ( 1916). 
33L /d. at 8. 
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education and the instruction of the citizenry. As the Court stated half a 
century ago, 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and 
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic 
society. It is required in the perforn1ance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument 
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education.332 
Thus, public schools are the institution to which the 
devotion of democracy . . . is a familiar fact. The superficial 
explanation is that a government resting upon popular suffrage 
cannot be successful unless those who elect and who obey their 
governors are educated. . . . But there is a deeper explanation. A 
democracy is more than a fon11 of government; it is primarilY- a 
mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.333 
To the extent a democratic society continues to broaden its 
participation in govennnent and interaction among its members, the 
more it is dependent upon that government's "deliberate effort to sustain 
and extend" the community of interests and to prepare its constituent 
members to actively participate and adapt.334 Thus are schools a civic 
enterprise in which all citizens have an interest, unlike the particular 
workings of the county highway department, the state bureau of motor 
vehicles, or the Federal Trade Commission. Indeed, most citizens insist 
on taking an interest in and having a hand at participating in this 
institutional enterprise. Consequently, most of what happens in schools 
is considered a matter of public concern. 
Muzzling teachers from speaking out about this institution smacks of 
an authoritarianism that is contrary to everything the institution stands 
for. Furthermore, the ordinary citizen would be puzzled to hear that 
teachers were fired for doing their jobs, and more so to hear that teachers 
are fired for speaking out on matters that concern the public, not just on 
teaching obligations but on matters that affect the administration of a 
332. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 34 7 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
333. DEWEY, supra note 330, at 87. 
334. /d. at 87-88. 
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school district and the management of taxpayer funds.335 
But most of all, many citizens are affected by public schools and 
interested in how they are run as a participatory governmental 
enterprise, one that is often open to the public for a very public 
enterprise. This is particularly so simply because school boards are 
elected. As the Court, in its wisdom, pointed out in Pickering, speaking 
out on matters of public concern in schools infortns the "free and open 
debate ... vital to inforn1ed decision-making by the electorate."336 A 
school board that uses Garcetti to stifle that debate runs significant risk 
of public and political backlash in this era of increasing accountability. 
A school board that squelches that type of speech runs the justifiable risk 
of adverse publicity337 and electioneering that accuses it of hiding 
something from the public. 
C. Airing the Dirty Laundry 
Adverse publicity is clearly one way for teachers to feel they are 
fulfilling their professional responsibilities yet armor themselves from 
retaliation. They may go public with disclosures through the media or 
by speaking out at public school board meetings, especially when the 
press is there. Going to the local media clearly insulated the teachers 
from retaliation in both Pickering and Mt. Healthy City School District 
Board of Education v. Doyle. Marvin Pickering wrote a letter to the 
editor of the local newspaper'38 while Fred Doyle telephoned a 
335. This is just one reason why Pickering is and should remain the model for teacher speech. 
Pickering's appositive, "teacher, as a citizen," did not identify two creatures teacher or citizen but 
one: teacher= citizen. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). As such, teachers were 
encouraged by the Pickering Court to use the infonnation to which they are privy qua teachers for 
communicating public concerns. "Teachers are, as a class, the members of the community most likely 
to have info• 1ned and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be 
spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of 
retaliatory dismissal." /d. at 572. 
336. /d. at 571-72. In a similar situation, the Court has stated: 
Our Constitution does not pennit the official suppression of ideas. Thus whether 
petitioners' removal of books from their school libraries denied respondents their First 
Amendment rights depends· upon the· ·motivation· ·behind· petitioners' -actions. If 
petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with 
which petitioners disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners' 
decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution. 
Bd. ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,871 (1982) (footnote omitted). 
337. Parents Expose Corrupt School Board (Full Disclosure Network Mar. 25, 2006), 
http://www.fulldisclosure.net/flash/452-3_CUSD_preview.php; Pat Kossan, School Districts on Notice, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 6, 2005, available at http://www.aznews.us/school_districts_on_notice.htm. 
338. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 575-78 (appendix to opinion of the court). 
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Cincinnati radio station.339 In addition, several post-Garcetti cases 
suggest that, had the "offending" teacher gone public first, the school 
district would have been in violation of the First Amendment for 
retaliating. For instance, of all Elihu McMahon's numerous 
communications about alleged school district problems, only three were 
deemed worthy of protection, including a letter to the New York 
Times.340 At the very least, speaking to the media is rarely if ever:-
within a teacher's "official" duties. 
Thus, case law supports the notion that teachers should make their 
concerns public rather than approach their administrators if they believe 
that matters of public concern in the school district are being 
inadequately addressed by the school administration or the school 
board.341 If the public has a right to know perhaps a need to know of 
mismanagement problems, then teachers must comply with that need 
and circumvent the ordinary lines of communication. And there is not 
much that a school board can do in response as prior restraint of teacher 
speech is prohibited.342 Nor can a school board assert that a teacher 
must go through "proper channels" on matters of public concem.343 So 
339. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.274, 282 (1977). 
340. McMahon v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. CV-01-6205, 2006 WL 3680624, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 12, 2006); see also Rush v. Perryman, No. 1 :07CVOOOO 1, 2007 WL 2091745 (E.D. Ark. July 17, 
2007) (finding that a college president's speech to the press was protected whereas his speech to a state 
legislative committee was not if undertaken pursuant to his official duties). Security specialist Robert B. 
Posey would have made out a case for retaliation if he had "communicate[ d] his concerns regarding 
school security and safety issues to the 'newspapers or [his] legislators."' Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille 
Sch. Dist. No. 84, No. CVOS-272, 2007 WL 420256, at •s (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 2007) (second alteration in 
original). And Gail Cole's complaints about bus discipline might have been better protected if they had 
been "made ... in an attempt to infonn the public or to further public discourse." Cole v. Anne Arundel 
County Bd. of Educ., No. CCB-05-1579, 2006 WL 3626888, at *7 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 2006); see also 
Bailey v. Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 451 F.3d 514, 519 (8th Cir. 2006) (suggesting, in 
dicta, that a state department of education employee would have made a. better case for First 
Amendment protection if his concerns had been "made public"). Such disclosures, of course, must be 
constrained by the Family Educational Rights & Privacy Act and state legislation that protects public 
employee privacy rights. 
341. See also Krystal LoPilato, Recent Case, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Lose First 
Amendment Protection for Speech Within Their Job Duties, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53 7, 543 
(2006). 
342. See City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 
U.S. 167, 175 ( 1976). "Whatever its duties as an employer, when the board sits in public meetings to 
conduct public business and hear the views of citizens, it may not be required to discriminate between 
speakers on the basis of their employment .... " /d. at 176 (citing Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 
96 (1972)). 
343. See Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 843 (7th Cir. 1985). The Seventh Circuit has 
determined a school board cannot discipline a teacher who foregoes the chain of command to speak 
directly to the board on matters of public concern when such communication did not disrupt the 
districfs provision of education services. /d. In like manner, a Texas federal district court stated, "the 
interest of the [school district] to have these matters [of public concern] channeled through a grievance 
procedure does not justify the tennination of [the teacher's] teaching contract under these 
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school boards face the prospect of having their dirty laundry aired in 
public with ·little recourse for retaliation unless the speech results in a 
disruption of educational services, a rather hard standard to meet when 
the matters are weighty issues ofpublic concern. 
Consequently, a more considered approach to the problem would be 
for school boards to fulfill their public role and act less like an employer 
and more like an institution in these matters. Such role would go back 
to the Pickering-Connick analysis and respect teachers' First 
Amendment rights to speak.344 A cooperative relationship would 
ultimately be more beneficial than an adversarial one, especially when 
there is a "common" enemy out there: the federal government and the 
new accountability measures. 
D. Accountability 
One of the cornerstones of the various education "reform" movements 
is to make teachers more accountable for their classroom teaching. 
Indeed, much of the premier legislation designed to achieve these 
reforms No Child Left Behind (NCLB)345 is dependent upon 
measuring school districts' accountability for student achievement. 346 
Although increasingly the one common enemy of school boards, 
administrators, and teachers,347 accountability specifically puts teachers 
under the gun:348 they can be rewarded for good scotes and they can be 
disciplined for bad scores be-cause, even if they are the chief delivery 
circumstances.'' Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653, 662 (N.D. Tex. 1973). Even more blunt was the 
pronouncement from a federal district court in Oregon: "The channels rules, which require advance 
notice to the sup,erintendent of any direct message to the, board, are an impennissible prior restraint." 
Anderson v. Cent. PointSch. Dist. No.6, 554 F. Supp. 600~ 608 (D. Ore. 1982), affd, 746 F.2d 505 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (citing Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1981)). Most recently, a 
2006 federal district court decision from New York detennined that a school district failed to articulate 
any government interests in support of its broad "communication protocol, that required teachers to 
follow a chain of command before discussing school matters with outside sources. Price v. Saugerties 
Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 105CV0465, 2006 WL 314458 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2006). 
344. See, e.g., Richard S. Vacca, Teacher First Amendment Speech 2006: Policy Implications, 
CEPI Eouc. L. NEWSL. (Commonwealth Educ. Policy lost., Richmond, Va.), Jan .. 2006, available at 
http:/ /www.cepi. vcu.edu/newsletter/2005-2006/2006_Jan_ Teacher_First_Amendment.html . 
.345. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
346. See, e.g., Wendy 'Beetlestone & Owen F. Lipsett, No Child Left Behind·'s Accountability and 
Access Provisions: An Inherent Tension Within Supplemental Educational Services Programs, 216 
Eouc. L. REP. 807 (2007); WilliamS. Koski, Achieving HAdequacy'' in the Classroom, 27 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 13 (2007); Gershon M. Ratner, Why the No Child Left Behind Act Needs to Be Restructured 
to Accomplish Its Goals and How to Do It, 9 UDC/DCSL L. REV. I (2007). 
347. See~ e.g., Philip T.K. Daniel, No Child Left Behind: The Balm of Gilead Has Arrived in 
American Education, 206 Eouc~ L. REP. 791 (2006). 
348. Leah A. Rinfret, No Child Left Behind for the Teachers Left Behind: Returning Education to 
the Educators, 35 CAP. U. L. REv. 281 (2006). 
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system of instruction, they remain mere public employees. 349 But 
Garcetti's progeny may have put paid to the notion that teachers can be 
held accountable for their teaching anymore if school boards are allowed 
to retaliate against teachers for classroom speech. 
If one follows through with the notions set forth in the Seventh 
Circuit's reasoning in Mayer v. Monroe County Community School 
Corp. 350 and in the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Boring v. Buncombe 
County Board of Education,351 rightly or wrongly decided, school 
boards are the sole deciders and therefore the sole defenders of 
curriculum now. Teachers in the public schools in at least the Fourth 
and Seventh Circuits no longer have any academic freedom to teach. 
Rather, teachers' curriculum delivery has become a function of 
employment not a function of education. Instead, the teachers are now 
just government speakers, and the rigor required of the curriculum lies 
entirely with the school board. As a consequence, teachers are no longer 
delegated the professional responsibilities they once held to "have at 
least some input into the school curriculum and . . . to exercise their 
professional discretion in translating that curriculum into classroom 
lessons."352 NCLB and decisions like those in Mayer and Boring tip the 
balance of professional power and teaching discretion into the hands of 
those least equipped to handle it but nevertheless eager to wield control 
over the modus of instruction.353 With such direct control over the 
instructional function, teachers are reduced to the puppets of school 
boards. Without the discretion to use their professional judgment, 
teachers are reduced to ministerial functionaries with no other academic 
function than to parrot the school board liturgy. 
Under those circumstances, there seems no foothold for holding 
teachers accountable for results. If teachers deliver the curriculum they 
are given by their employers, then they must be rewarded for doing their 
jobs, not punished if the appropriate results are not achieved. Because 
teachers will no longer have any control or discretion on student 
achievement, school boards cannot make them accountable for the 
results. Consequently, teachers in at least the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits seem to have escaped the accountability hammer because, 
without academic freedom, they have no discretion with which to be 
held accountable. Only the school boards can be held accountable when 
349. Daly, supra note 306, at 45 (positing that, in a rigidly hierarchical school district, teachers are 
unfairly made accountable for the curricular and educational decisions made by the school board). 
350. 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 160 (2007). 
351. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998). 
352. Daly, supra note 306, at 48-49. 
353. /d. at 49. 
1338 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76 
academic freedom is absent.354 · 
In conjunction with this new-found power of the school boards, 
however, is the courts' increased power to second-guess curricular 
decisions and the delivery of instruction. Right now, one of the few 
judicial bulwarks from claims of educational malpractice that school 
boards have enjoyed is that, among other things, there is no readily 
articulated standard of care for teaching: 
Unlike the activity of the highway or the marketplace, classroom 
methodology affords no readily acceptable standards of care, or 
cause, or injury. The science of pedagogy itself is fraught with 
different and conflicting theories .of how or what a child should be 
taught, and any layman might and commonly does have his 
own emphatic views on the subject. The "injury" claimed here is 
plaintiffs inability to read and write. Substantial professional 
authority attests that the achievement of literacy in the schools, or 
its failure, are [sic] influenced by a host of factors which affect the 
pupil subjectively, from outside the formal teaching process, and 
beyond the control of its ministers. They may be physical, 
neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; the~ may be 
present but not perceived, recognized but not identified.3 5 
Now that the courts have removed pedagogy from the equation and 
teachers are simply the mouthpieces for whatever the school board 
directs them to say, the policies behind dismissing educational 
malpractice cases out of hand have much less substance and support. 
The loss of academic freedom renders the failure of the academic 
function a matter of mere negligence, easily decided 'by the courts. 356 
354~ To take advantage of this loss of academic freedom, school boards can now wrest curriculum 
construction from the professional educators and do it all themselves. On the one hand, any delegation 
of those duties would cloak the teachers and administrators with ipso facto academic freedom and would 
act as a waiver or estoppel of a school board's arguments against academic freedom. On the other hand, 
such derogation of academic freedom may increase court interfere.nce in the affairs of school districts. 
To the extent that instructional choices become ministerial rather than discretionary (and therefore 
outside the expertise of courts), then courts will begin to believe themselves as well equipped to make 
instructional decisions as school boards. To the extent that the Court has not embraced fully embraced 
the school-board delegation model, the onus may well be on school boards rather than teachers: 
School boards are generally quite content to delegate authority to teachers, for reasons of 
managerial efficiency and recognition of teachers' superior professional. expertise. The 
courts are required to intervene and enforce this division of labor only in rare cases where 
the structure breaks down. Various lower courts have done so; however, despite 
supportive language, the Supreme Court has never explicit1y endorsed the delegation 
model. 
/d. at 47-48 (footnotes omitted). 
355. Peter W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860--61 (Ct. App. 1976), quoted in 
Hunterv. Bd. ofEduc., 439 A.2d 582, 584 (Md. 1982). 
356. See, e.g., Hyman v. Greent 403 N.W.2d 597 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Webber v. Yeo, 383 
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An additional effect of removing academic freedom from public 
school teachers is the legal characterization of the teaching function 
itself. The school boards within the jurisdictions of the Seventh and 
Fourth Circuits now have on their hands teaching employees with only 
ministerial functions. As any public employer should know, ministerial 
functions are usually not immune from tort liability because the 
qualified privilege from attack often only exists when a public employee 
is acting in a discretionary capacity.357 Indeed, state tort claims acts 
often except only discretionary but not ministerial acts from tort 
liability.358 Thus, the school boards have laid themselves open to 
"permitting damages suits [that] can entail substantial social costs, 
including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing 
litigation will unduly inhibit [them] in the discharge of their duties."359 
Heaven forbid that educational malpractice cases ever gain traction. 
However, the school boards are flirting with disaster in denying to their 
most qualified employees the liberty to exercise their educational 
function. With the increased attention to accountability and the 
reduction of student learning and teacher instruction to a numbers game, 
the current education reform measures have sowed fertile ground for 
easily provable acts of negligence.360 Indeed, the strictures of NCLB 
have made the failure to achieve those numbers virtually a matter of 
negligence per se. In removing the cushion of the discretionary function 
of academic freedom, the school boards are going to find themselves 
answerable not just to the federal government and their state 
departments of education, but also to their student constituents. Surely 
that is not what school boards intended in litigating to appeal those 
academic freedom cases that were essentially political controversies 
easily mediated with the parents and teachers. Retaliation clearly has its 
costs. 
Perhaps the most effective remedy to that problem is to create a 
written policy of the school board's fundamental belief in academic 
freedom, within the Pickering limits. Indeed, collective bargaining 
agreements containing academic freedom language would reinstate the 
equilibrium between the school board's fiscal tasks and teachers' 
instructional tasks.361 One such comprehensive provision states: 
N.W.2d 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). 
357. See, e.g. , Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). 
358. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, EDUCATION LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 670-71 (2005). 
359. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)). 
360. See Todd A. DeMitchell & Terri A. DeMitchell, Statutes and Standards: Has the Door to 
Educational Malpractice Been Opened?, 2003 BYU Eouc. & L.J. 485. 
361. See, e.g., Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 538 (lOth Cir. 1979) (limited academic 
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Academic Freedom 
(1) It is mutually recognized that freedom carries with it responsibility; 
academic freedom also carries with it academic responsibility which is 
deterrnined by the basic ideals; goals, and institutions of the local 
community. Discussion and analysis of controversial issues should be 
conducted within the framework of the fundamental values of the 
community as they are expressed in the educational philosophy and 
objectives of the Board. 
(2) Within the preceding frame of reference and as it pertains to the 
course to which a teacher is assigned, academic freedom in the Fort 
Wayne Community Schools is defined as: 
(a) The right to teach and learn about controversial issues which have 
economic, political, scientific, or social significance. 
(b) The right to use materials which are relevant to the levels of ability 
and maturity of the students and to the purposes of the school system. 
(c) The right to maintain a classroom environment which is conducive to 
the free exchange and examination of ideas which have economic, 
political, scientific; or social significance. 
(d) The right of teachers to participate fully in the public affairs of the 
community. 
(e) The right of students to hold divergent ideas as long as the expression 
of their dissent is done within the guidelines of debate and discussion 
which are generally accepted by teachers in a normal classroom 
environment. 
(f) The right of teachers to free expression of conscience as private 
citizens with the correlative_ responsibility of a professional presentation 
of balanced views relating to controversial issues as they are studied in 
the classroom. 362 . 
The converse of such agreement even if only in principle is the pall 
of orthodoxy decried by the Court and its inherent threat to the 
institution: 
Teachers, if forced to act as a mouth-piece for the school board, are the 
most efficient tools of indoctrination imaginable. A system that permits 
teachers to act as opposing voices within curricular parameters 
established by a popularly elected school board minimizes the potential of 
either actor to distort their educational function into brainwashing. 363 
freedom provision in collective bargaining agreement). 
362. 2004 07 Master Contract Between the Board of School Trustees of Fort Wayne Community 
Schools and Fort Wayne Education Association, Inc. 30 (on file with author). 
363. Daly, supra note 306; at 46. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The history of First Amendment protection for public employees is 
dependent upon the history of First Amendment protections for teachers. 
For good or ill, teachers have found themselves as the forward unit in 
setting out the stakes governing the free speech relationship between the 
public employer and the public employee. Perhaps teachers' unique 
characteristics make their speech the natural target for employment 
retaliation they are, after all, hired for their communication skills. 
However, perhaps teachers' unique characteristics also make Garcetti 
ill-suited for any long-term application. 
Teachers have so many obligations to their students, their schools, 
their administrators and their colleagues that are peripheral to the actual 
instruction that they have a hard time enunciating what is not 
professional speech in any particular teaching assignment. 364 
Professionalism on the job for teachers digs more deeply and sweeps 
more broadly than any enumeration of specific duties to a special, 
expansive citizenship responsibility. Teachers are considered to be the 
schools they do not just do a job; rather, they are the institution. 
Identified as being the bulwark of the institution means to bear the 
responsibilities the institution itself is expected to carry in the life of this 
country. Thus, teachers are never really off the job of an institution that 
is ubiquitous and essential to this county. Now, they are being told that 
they have to be careful of what they say in all aspects of their jobs and to 
be able to bifurcate that which is official-duty-speech from that which is 
citizen-speech. 
The constraints on teachers are immediately apparent; the impact on 
the institution will become more evident with the passage of time and an 
364. David Moss explains: 
Although there is no typical day that is representative of the full range of what it is to 
teach, ... these notions offer insight into the dedication, emotional toll, and knowledge 
base required oftoday's teachers. 
Perhaps most significant is the effort expended by each of these educators with 
respect to the desire to meet the needs of each student in class. Whether it is scheduling 
meetings to coordinate student support, revising lessons over the course of a single school 
day in response to the learning styles of students, or developing curriculum materials to 
capture student interest and sustain motivation, there is an underlying element of respect 
and personal attention for students expressed by each teacher. Differentiating instruction, 
attending to students' needs and interests, and providing support beyond the confines of 
traditional classroom time are all measures designed to meet the needs of each and every 
learner. 
David M. Moss with Shirley Reilly, Christopher Burdman & Sayward Parsons, Walk a Mile in Their 
Shoes: A Day in the Life of Professional Educators, in PORTRAIT OF A PROFESSION: TEACHING AND 
TEACHERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 85, 106 (David M. Moss et al. eds., 2005). 
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increasing number of retaliation cases. In addition to the obvious 
harms blow to morale, loss of public confidence, and potential spike in 
litigation other tertiary concerns will begin to emerge. For instance, 
school districts that retaliate for reporting child abuse and neglect will 
become targets of lawsuits by parents for failing to prevent subsequent 
abuse;365 as often as possible, teachers will learn to entwine 
controversial speech with federal legislation that affords a cause of 
action for retaliation 366 or with applicable state whistleblower laws;367 
teachers will find alternative causes of action against school boards who 
retaliate, asserting intentional torts such as intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, 368 defamation, and stigma, 369 which entail punitive 
damages awards; and school administrators will find themselves 
investigated on criminal charges of intimidation.370 In any case, no 
public employee should be put into the position of having to choose her 
job over her duty as Garcetti requires. This is only a lose-lose situation 
for both children ,and the institution itself. 
. . 
Surely there are better ways for school boards to govern their labor 
relationships. A return to Pickering, which better suits teachers and the 
employment relationship, would still accomplish what school boards 
intend a moderate grasp on their employees' behavior. Garcetti is a 
bazooka in a knife fight and with the same incipient risks of blowing 
up in one's face. 
365. See, e.g., Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995). Worse yet will be the criminal 
investigations for failure to report. 
366. Titles VI, VII, and IX and the Rehabilitation Act currently protect individuals from 
retaliation for speech arising from their rights. See supra notes 200-206 and accompanying text. 
367. See generally FISCHER, SCHIMMEL & STELLMAN, supra note 302, at 134. 
368. See, e.g., Radvany v. Jones, 585 N. Y.S.2d 343 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that principal could 
be sued for intentional infliction of emotional· distress for intimidating his assistant principal after he 
retaliated against her for reporting a teacher had ·altered students' answers for the· Regents examination). 
369. See, e.g., Worona & Randall, supra note 323, at 13-1, 13-8. 
370. In line with efforts at prior restraint will be the temptation for school administrators and 
school boards to use Garcetti as a weapon, to threaten teachers with retaliation for doing their jobs, 
Criminal statutes concerning intimidation would forestall that sort of persistent behavior, especially 
when one threatens the victim with hann if the victim does a lawful act. See, e.g., IND. CODE§ 35-45-2-
. . 
1 (2007) (a Class D felony if against an employee of a school corporation); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 265; 
§ 25 (2007). Other statutes specifically criminalize acts of intimidation against public employees who 
are doing their jobs. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-2 (2007) (obstructing governmental operations); 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-6 (2007) (public official); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 509.080 (West 2007) (an 
officia1); NEV. REv. STAT.§ 199.300 (2007) (public employee). It would be nice if one could say that 
school administrators will not intimidate teachers, but they do. See, e.g., Rabon v. Bryan County Bd. of 
Educ., 326 S.E.2d 577 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding tennination of principal for, among other things, 
intimidating teachers). 
